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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Time for a New Approach
U.S. policymakers face a virtual conundrum: how best to incorporate
the new Internet Protocol ("IP")-centric services, applications, and facilities
into the nation's pre-existing legal and public policy construct. Over the
next several years, legislators and regulators will find themselves
increasingly challenged to make the Internet adapt itself to the already
well-defined bricks-and-mortar, services-and-technologies environment
that exists today under the Communications Act and other statutes.
Some argue that new IP services should be "shoe-horned" into the
existing requirements of the legacy system, despite the poor fit. Others
believe that new classifications and definitions can be created within the
confines of legacy regulations. In this Author's view, however, the optimal
solution is to turn the conundrum around on itself, and to begin adapting
our legal thinking and institutions to the reality of how the Internet is
fundamentally changing the very nature of the business and social world.
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In this Article, the Author will explain that trying to impose the
current, outmoded legal system onto the Internet and all its IP progeny is a
flawed, damaging, and ultimately doomed approach. Instead, policymakers
should adopt a new public policy framework that regulates along horizontal
network layers, rather than legacy vertical silos.
Market Reality: Horizontal Networks (Layers)
For decades, packet-switched data communications networks have
been constructed around several fundamental organizing principles,
including the "protocol layering" concept (networks employ different
functional rules, or protocols, arranged in layered stacks) and the "end-to-
end network" concept (dumb networks support intelligent applications).
Together, protocol layering and end-to-end principles have become the
building blocks of the Internet. In the resulting layered protocol stack, the
IP resides in the "middle" logical layers, with physical network facilities at
layers below and user applications and content at layers above.
As technology has evolved, existing networks and markets have
begun converging to common IP platforms. Key inherent aspects of this IP-
centric New World Order include blurred distinctions between services,
lack of relevant geographic boundaries, and a mesh of virtual
interconnected networks. Moreover, this network architecture tends to
shape and drive business fundamentals.
Legal Legacy: Vertical Rules (Silos)
While networks and markets have been evolving towards an all-IP
world, the U.S. legal and regulatory framework remains stuck in the past.
The Communications Act and implementing rules divide up the landscape
based on traditional service, technology, and industry labels, such as
wireline telephony service, wireless telephony service, cable television
service, broadcast television and radio service, and satellite broadcast
service. These divisions assume clear, unwavering distinctions, with
different categories defined by the assumed static characteristics of discrete
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services or networks. The result is an inflexible approach of isolated
"buckets" or "silos" governed by black-and-white, all-or-nothing thinking.
Problem: Unworkable Overlays (Gridlock)
The resulting clash between data networks constructed of horizontal
protocol layers, and the legal and regulatory artifice of the vertical silos,
inevitably leads to uncertainty, confusion, and gridlock on all sides. Our
fractured laws and regulations fail to reflect the reality of the converging
markets and networks. Policymakers attempting to impose current legal
standards on the Internet quickly run afoul of its powerful governing
dynamic, which shatters all of the past service, definitional, technological,
and geographic limitations.
As a result, legacy distinctions largely lose their meaning in this all-
encompassing IP world. More critically, forcing legacy regulations on IP
services and networks stifles the creativity and innovation that is the
essence of the Internet. Outmoded regulations tend to impose unnecessary
legal restrictions in some cases, as well as overlook significant market
concentration issues in other cases.
Solution: Rules and Networks Aligned (Layers)
To avoid the risk of further serious damage, policymakers must move
away from the increasingly outmoded vertical "silos" that artificially
separate communications-related services, networks, and industries from
each other. Informed by the way that engineers create layered protocol
models, and inspired by the analytical work of noted academics and
technology experts, policymakers should adopt a comprehensive legal and
regulatory framework founded on the Internet's horizontal network layers.
We must build our laws around the Internet, rather than the other way
around. By tracking the architectural model of the Internet-with IP at the
center-we can develop a powerful analytical tool providing granular
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market analysis within each layer, which in turn puts public policy on a
more sure empirical footing.
'P
The Proposed Layers Model Framework
The Author proposes a robust, yet flexible, set of layering principles
built on the sound notion of "respecting the integrity of the layers."1 This
framework encompasses both the "unregulated" e-commerce and e-
business space, and the "regulated" telecommunications space. The
proposed Network Layers Model conceptualizes four network layers-
Physical Layer (with separate Access and Transport components), Logical
Layer (IP), Applications Layer, and Content Layer. Such a framework
helps achieve important public policy objectives, including: (1) avoiding
unsupportable legacy distinctions between services, networks, and
industries; (2) separating upper layers (user applications and content) from
lower layers (physical and logical networks); (3) grouping and segregating
pertinent public policy issues; (4) providing insights about the
interdependence of different layers; (5) highlighting interconnection
between networks and functional layers; (6) focusing selectively on
curtailing pockets of market power within and between individual layers;
and (7) preserving the "innovation commons" of the Internet.
Content
Applications
Logical
1'h ,ical
In particular, when applied in the telecommunications industry
context, the Network Layers Model targets the lower network layers for
discrete regulation based on the existence of significant market power,
rather than legacy service or industry labels. This framework concomitantly
fosters maximum innovation by leaving otherwise competitive content and
applications markets unfettered by regulation.
1. Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture
and the Law, at 29 (University of San Diego School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory
Research Paper No. 55) (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=416263.
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The Network Layers Model can be used to analyze and resolve
discrete public policy issues, such as:
* Internet content and transactions-any attempts to limit or
curtail Content or Applications Layer activities (legitimate or
otherwise) should not result in Logical or Physical Layer
regulation;
* Broadband regulation-last-mile Physical Access Layer
facilities with significant market power should allow
nondiscriminatory wholesale access to other service
providers and applications;
" Voice over IP ("VoIP")-IP communications reside as one
of many capabilities at the Applications Layer, and should
not be saddled with inappropriate Physical Layer regulation;
* Interconnection-any obligations to provide interconnection,
including open interfaces between layers and networks,
should be imposed at various layers based on the presence
and degree of market power;
* Universal service-ultimate responsibility for the Federal
Universal Service Fund ("FUSF") requirement and
contribution mechanism should reside at the Physical Layer.
Thus, the Network Layers Model can help reveal, clarify, and resolve
thorny issues related to the legal upheaval caused by the advancing IP
world.
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I. OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY
This Article proposes that U.S. policymakers develop, apply, and
promote a new network engineering-informed public policy framework for
all IP-based services, applications, and facilities. The framework would be
founded upon the multiple network "layers" or "levels" built into the
construct of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
("TCP/IP") stack. If adopted, the tailored principles established by the
horizontal layers framework could be used to analyze the viability of
specific legislative, regulatory, and administrative proposals. The principles
also could provide a compelling new way to frame current policy issues in
the larger context of non-arbitrary engineering functionalities.
The horizontal layers framework entailed in the proposed Network
Layers Model would help further a number of important objectives in the
public policy space, including:
* Creating a rational, sustainable legal and regulatory
framework for the coming IP-centric world;
* Preventing the unwarranted imposition of legacy
telecommunications regulation and new Internet Service
Provider ("ISP") liability obligations on IP-based
applications, by the Executive Branch, Congress, the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC," or "Commission"),
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), and other national
regulators;
" Justifying preemption of intrusive Internet regulation by
states and localities;
* Lessening or removing existing legacy retail regulation of
competitive telecommunications services (such as traditional
voice telephony service); and
* Focusing regulatory and antitrust attention and resources on
the compelling public policy issue of fostering maximum
competition in last-mile physical infrastructure.
In short, this Article proposes nothing less than a comprehensive yet
flexible framework that policymakers should apply to all electronic
transmission technologies and services supported by the TCP/IP suite.
Moreover, the framework need not be confined to the world of the Internet,
as the basic protocol topologies further described below apply equally well
to other types of networks, including Plain Old Telephone Service
("POTS") networks, as well as frame relay, Asyncronous Transfer Mode
("ATM"), Multi-Protocol Label Switching ("MPLS"), and Ethernet. At
minimum, the network layers principle can have a separate function as a
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useful tool for analyzing pressing issues in the e-commerce and e-business
arena, as well as current telecommunications issues such as local
competition, broadband regulation, IP-based voice communications
("Voice over IP" or "VoIP"), intercarrier compensation, and universal
service funding. As a result, this Article proposes to incorporate the
conceptual underpinnings of the layers principle into all facets of current
U.S. communications-related public policy debates. Through the judicious
use of this principle, public policy choices can be grounded not in vague
theoretical abstractions, but in the ways that communications networks
actually are designed, constructed, and operated.
Part I of this Article provides the pertinent legal and technical
background. It also sets the stage for explanation of the "layers principle"
in Part II, as described and endorsed by a small but growing number of
legal, economic, and technology commentators. Part III applies the layers
principle, as formulated most comprehensively by Professor Lawrence
Solum, in the context of current e-commerce issues (Part III.A.). Because
Professor Solum provides a thorough analysis of the layers principle in
various e-commerce settings, the bulk of the Article introduces additional
corollaries and analyzes regulatory debates in the traditional common
carrier context, with a particular focus on broadband, VoIP, and other
present-day telecommunications regulatory issues (Part III.B.). In this
Author's judgment, while application of the layers framework does not
miraculously provide ready-made answers to every public policy
conundrum, at the very least it does allow policymakers to start asking the
right kinds of questions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The World of Legacy Communications Regulation
In the "old" days before the Internet, the particular communications
service offered and the underlying technology utilized essentially were
considered as one and the same. For example, the copper telephone line
carried voice telephony service, the coaxial cable line carried cable
television video service, and radio waves carried broadcast television and
radio services. Later, different radio bands were used to provide wireless
telephony services and satellite broadcast television service.
Communications-related industries, many of them monopolies or
oligopolies, sprang up and developed around these technology platforms,
and the particular retail services they provided to the public.
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As a result of this previously unquestioned fit of message and
medium, U.S. policymakers tended to organize the country's legal and
regulatory superstructure around these "vertical" composite systems.2
Notably the Communications Act of 1934, ("1934 Act") and subsequent
amendments, bought into this notion of vertically-oriented regulation, and
so we have different law provisions-such as Title II (telephony), Title III
(television and radio communications and wireless communications), and
Title VI (cable television) of the 1934 Act-that apply to different
service/technology "silos." '3 Not surprisingly, the FCC adopted the same
schema when it formed the Common Carrier Bureau (now Wireline
Competition Bureau), the Mass Media Bureau, and later the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau. Figure 1 demonstrates the resulting legal
"silos."
2. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 37, 39-40 (2002) [hereinafter Werbach, A Layered Model] ("Traditionally,
communications policy was organized around horizontal divisions between service
categories and between geographic regions."). Werbach's references to "vertical" and
"horizontal" regulation in his paper essentially invert the terminology employed by other
commentators, and in this paper, likely because he is referring to the "vertical" protocol
stacks that are made up of "horizontal" layers. See also Douglas C. Sicker, Further Defining
a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, Paper Presented at the
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference ("TPRC") 4 (2002), available at
http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2002/95/LayeredTelecomPolicy.pdf [hereinafter Sicker,
Further Defining a Layered Model] (Traditionally "regulatory conditions are based on the
type of infrastructure on which a telecommunications service is offered .... This regulatory
structure is often referred to as the 'silo model' of regulation, in that each network and
service is regulated separately from the other."); Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and
"Telecommunications Services," Universal Service Mechanisms, Access Charges, and
Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 213 ("American
communications law has developed along service-specific lines, with complex and distinct
regulatory structures covering telephony (wired and wireless), broadcasting, cable
television, and satellites."); Franqois Bar & Christian Sandvig, Rules From Truth: Post-
Convergence Policy for Access, Paper Presented at the Twenty-Eighth Conference on
Communication, Information and Internet Policy 3 (Sept. 2000) ("Modern communication
policy in most of the world has evolved to treat different media as islands.").
3. 47 U.S.C. tit. II, tit. III, and tit. VI (2003); see Sicker, Further Defining a Layered
Model, supra note 2, at 4 (explaining that in the U.S. silo model, each network and service
is regulated separately from the other, and "the top defines the regulatory Title"). Attorney
John Nakahata calls this arrangement "regulation by service 'pigeonhole."' John T.
Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Communications
Regulation from the Bottom Up, I J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95, 100 (2002).
[Vol. 56
THE NETWORK LA YERS MODEL
The Present "Silo Model" of Regulation
Title 11 Title III Title III Title VI
nVOICE PVOICE A UDIO V1 DEZ(
VIDE~O
Wireline Wireless Brxoadcast C-aVjK
Telephony Telephony Radi1lA Tceva
Figure 1
Beginning in the mid-i 960s, the FCC took a first tentative step away
from the vertical silos approach in the telephony space by separating out a
certain category of new applications and services that happen to utilize
basic telephony facilities. In the initial Computer Inquiry decision
("Computer I"), the FCC began wrestling with fundamental questions
concerning the observed growing convergence between the "modern-day
electronic computer" and "communication common carrier facilities and
services."' Even at this early stage, the FCC had already recognized that
computer-based services are separate from, and increasingly depend upon,
communications services, and that a different regulatory regime was
necessary to allow the nascent computing industry to compete without
undue interference from government regulators or meddling
communications carriers.
After several inconclusive starts, in 1980 the FCC issued its seminal
Computer Hi order, which distinguished those services that should continue
to be regulated as common carriage offerings under Title 11 of the
Communications Act, from those services that utilize communications
4. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and
Communication Services and Facilities), Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, para. 1, 8 Rad.
Reg.2nd (P & F) 1567 (1966) [hereinafter Computer 1].
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inputs in a highly competitive, and unregulated, "value-added" services
marketplace.5 The Commission classified all services offered over a
telecommunications network as either "basic" or "enhanced." Put simply,
"basic transmission services are traditional common carrier
communications services" provided by telephone companies, and
"enhanced services are not."'6 More specifically, the Commission observed
that basic service constitutes "the common carrier offering of transmission
capacity for the movement of information. 7 In contrast, an enhanced
service must meet one of three criteria: it must (1) employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, protocol, or similar
aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information; (2) provide the
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or (3) involve
subscriber interaction with stored information.8 In all cases, an enhanced
service by definition is "offered over common carrier transmission facilities
used in interstate communications;" in other words, a basic
communications component underlies every enhanced service, so that an
enhanced service essentially "rides" on a basic service. Because enhanced
services are provided in a competitive marketplace, the FCC decided to
leave them unregulated.9
While the Computer Inquiry rules are remembered largely for the
creation of these important definitional distinctions between regulated basic
services and unregulated enhanced services, perhaps an even more critical
decision followed. The FCC had the then-uncommon insight that because
basic communications service constitutes "the building block" upon which
enhanced services are offered, "enhanced services are dependent upon the
common carrier offering of basic services . . . ."' The Commission
expressed concern that then-AT&T would have the motive and opportunity
to provide unregulated enhanced services in a way that used its own
underlying communications facilities and services in a discriminatory and
anticompetitive manner. In order to protect against the potential for carriers
to commit anticompetitive acts against Enhanced Service Providers
("ESPs"), the Commission required such carriers to unbundle and provide
the underlying basic transmission services to all ESPs on a
nondiscriminatory basis. The thrust of this requirement, the Commission
explained, is "to establish a structure under which common carrier
transmission facilities are offered by them to all providers of enhanced
5. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 47 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 700 (1980)
[hereinafter Computer Ill.
6. Id. para. 119.
7. Id. para. 93.
8. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2003).
9. Computer!!, supra note 5, paras. 100-01.
10. Id. para. 231.
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services (including their own enhanced subsidiary) on an equal basis.""
This requirement "provides a structural constraint on the potential for abuse
of the parent's market power through controlling access to and use of the
underlying [transmission] facilities in a discriminatory and anticompetitive
manner."' 2 That requirement still applies today to all telecommunications
carriers, including the incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs").
Deservedly, much has been made of the crucial role that the FCC's
basic/enhanced distinction, and concomitant ESP "equal access"
requirement, played in the ultimate birth and development of the Internet.
Robert Cannon, for example, claims that the Computer Inquiry rules were
"a necessary precondition for the success of the Internet" because they
involved "affirmative and aggressive regulation of communications
networks, specifically for the benefit of the computer networks."' 3 Jonathan
Weinberg states that the approach taken in the Computer Inquiry
proceeding "was wildly successful in spurring innovation and competition
in the enhanced-services marketplace," because "[glovernment maintained
its control of the underlying transport, sold primarily by regulated
monopolies, while eschewing any control over the newfangled, competitive
'enhancements.""' 4 In the same vein, Philip Weiser notes that the FCC's
insistence on non-discriminatory access obligations would "ensure that the
telecommunications network could be used for a variety of services (e.g.,
Internet access) and that rival companies could market equipment like
modems that could connect to the network.' 15
Vint Cerf, widely acknowledged as a "father of the Internet," also has
pointed out how the Computer Inquiry decisions allowed thousands of
players to "unleash their creative, innovative, and inspired product and
service ideas in the competitive information services marketplace, without
artificial barriers erected by the local telephone companies." 6 In Cerf's
judgment, "the Commission's foresight in this area contributed strongly
towards the commercial introduction, rise, and incredible success of the
Internet."' 7
11. Id. para. 229.
12. Id.
13. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission's
Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 169, 180 (2003).
14. Weinberg, supra note 2, at 222.
15. Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, I J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 1, 12 (2002).
16. Letter from Vinton G. Cerf, Senior Vice-President, WorldCom, Inc., to the
Honorable Donald Evans, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, and the Honorable Michael
Powell, Chairman, FCC (May 20, 2002), available at http://global.mci.com/us/enterprise/
insight/cerfs-up/issues/broadband-letter.xml [hereinafter Cerf Letter to Evans/Powell].
17. Id.
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Perhaps overlooked in this justifiable praise is the fact that the FCC
had adopted what one could call a "horizontal" layered regulatory
approach, at odds with the "vertical" silos of the Communications Act. As
mentioned previously, the Computer Inquiry orders determined that online
information services were one type of thing essentially "riding on top of'
basic telecommunications services. Robert Cannon has indicated that the
basic versus enhanced dichotomy "established a transformation in the
conceptual framework, migrating from attempts to determine differences
between technologies [Computer I] to an examination of differences
between services experienced by edge users."" Cannon indicates that the
Computer Inquiry, though not necessarily overtly, adopted a horizontal
layered model of regulation. 9 Douglas Sicker writes that the Computer
Inquiry orders "set out the original layered model; separation of the basic
transport network from that of the services."2 Kevin Werbach also believes
that the FCC's basic/enhanced distinction can be viewed as a partial
implementation of an appropriately layered approach. "The binary
distinction embodied in the Computer 1I and Computer III decisions ... is
not sufficiently fine-grained to address the issues in today's data-centric
networks, but it has proved quite resilient given the technological and
competitive changes since it was first developed."'" Wittingly or otherwise,
the notion of differentiated regulation of the horizontal layers of an
electronic communications system was born.
18. Cannon, supra note 10, at 183.
19. Id. at 194-198.
20. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 5.
21. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 65. At the same time, Werbach
questions whether the Computer Inquiry orders merely added a new category of services
carved out of the existing Title II rules. See id. As noted previously, Werbach's references to
"vertical" and "horizontal" regulation in his paper essentially invert the terminology
employed by the Author and other commentators and in this paper.
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Figure 2
B. The Network Engineering Concept of Layered Architecture
Of course, even as the FCC first began looking at the definitional
issues in its Computer Inquiry docket, the various online networks that
eventually would comprise the commercial Internet were already being
organized around fundamental engineering principles. Key to that
organization was the concept of horizontally layered and vertically stacked
network architecture, which together with application of the "end-to-end"
principle have formed the basis for modern telecommunications
architecture standards.22
1. The Layering and End-to-End Principles
One significant point in the development of the modem
communications network came in 1969, while the Network Working Group
("NWG") of graduate students was working on the U.S. Department of
Defense Advanced Research Project Agency ("ARPA") network's host-to-
host communications system. Among other achievements, the group
adopted the word "protocol" (then in widespread use in the medical and
political fields to mean "agreed procedures") to denote the set of rules
22. See, e.g., Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 58 (stating that Internet
architecture "is based on ... end-to-end design and a layered protocol stack").
The Birth of the Layered Regulatory Approach
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created to enable communications via the ARPANET.23 In addition, the
NWG wrestled with the question of how to construct the foundational
protocol in relation to application protocols. As authors Katie Hafner and
Matthew Lyon described it:
Whatever structure they chose, they knew they wanted it to be as open,
adaptable, and accessible to inventiveness as possible. The general
view was that any protocol was a potential building block, and so the
best approach was to define simple protocols, each limited in scope,
with the expectation that any of them might someday be joined or
modified in various unanticipated ways. The protocol design
philosophy adopted by the NWG broke ground for what came to be
widely accepted as the "layered" approach to protocols. 4
Five years later, Vint Cerf and Robert Kahn issued their seminal paper on
the TCP/IP protocol suite, in which the authors "present a protocol design
and philosophy that supports the sharing of resources that exist in different
packet switching networks. 25
Simply put, it is difficult and undesirable to write a single protocol (a
set of standardized rules governing the format and conventions of data
transmissions between two devices) to handle every operation in a network.
As a result, engineers use multiple protocols that partition a communication
problem into disparate sub-problems and organize the software into
modules that handle the sub-problems. Functions are allocated to different
protocol layers or levels, with standardized interfaces between layers. The
flexibility offered through the layering approach allows products and
services to evolve by accommodating changes made at the appropriate
layer, rather than having to rework the entire set of protocols. In other
words, layering allows changes to implementation of one layer without
affecting others, as long as the interfaces between the layers remain
23. Additionally, in a private conversation with the Author in the fall of 2003, Vint Cerf
reported that the ancient Greek root "protokollon" referred to the bit of papyrus affixed to
the beginning of a scroll to describe its contents-much like the header of an Internet
packet.
24. KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS
OF THE INTERNET 147 (1996).
25. Vinton G. Cerf and Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network
Intercommunication, IEEE Trans. On Comms, Com-22, No. 5 (May 1974), available at
http://cs.mills.edu/180/reading/CK74.pdf [hereinafter Cerf/Kahn TCP Paper].
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constant.26 Figures 3 and 4 show the major advantage of a layered
engineering approach.
Without Layers
In the absence of layering, each individual application must
be reconfigured to accommodate every type of network
Figure 3
26. As Shah, Sicker, and Hatfield put it:
Protocol layering is a common technique to simplify networking designs by
dividing them into functional layers, and assigning protocols to perform each
layer's task. . . . The concept of layering relies on breaking a complex task into
smaller subsets, each of which addresses a specific issue. Each layer provides a
well-defined set of services to the layers above it and depends on lower layers for
its own foundation.
Ashish Shah et al., Thinking About Openness in the Telecommunications Policy Context,
Paper Presented at The Thirty-First Telecommunications Policy Research Conference 13
(Sept. 20, 2003), available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2003/244/openness2.pdf.
Application
Physical
Infrastructure
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Figure 4
Given the obvious benefits of protocol layering in terms of
simplifying network design and management issues, telecommunications
network architectures historically have been broken into various protocol-
derived layers. Almost by definition, layers create a degree of
"modularity," which allows for ease of maintenance within the network.
This modularity, or independence, of each layer creates a useful level of
abstraction as one moves through the layered stack. As shown above,
applications or protocols at higher layers can be developed or modified
with little or no impact on lower layers. This can result in tremendous
efficiencies when one seeks to upgrade an existing application (higher
layer) that makes extensive use of underlying physical infrastructure (lower
layer). Additionally, layers facilitate communications between disparate
communications networks.27
Moreover, the concept of an "end-to-end" network design is closely
related to, and provides substantial support for, the concept of protocol
27. See W. RICHARD STEVENS, TCP/IP ILLUSTRATED: THE PROTOCOLS 4-5 (Addison-
Wesley Professional Computing Series, 1994).
[Vol. 56
THE NETWORK LA YERS MODEL
layering. Timothy Wu, one of the first scholars to analyze the layered
approach with relation to Internet legal analysis, points out that "[t]he
decision to adopt a layered network architecture does not answer the
subsequent question: where exactly to place network functions within this
architecture."28 By itself, the architecture is an empty shell, without
specifications on how what Wu calls "the duty to code function" (the
ability to delineate specific network functions) will be delegated among
layers.29 In essence, the end-to-end argument states that a class of functions
can only be completely and correctly implemented by the applications at
each end of a network communication.3 °
As related to the Internet, the end-to-end argument is transformed into
a principle "to make the basic Internet protocols simple, general, and open,
leaving the power and functionality in the hands of the application."31
Weiser indicates that the end-to-end network design "allows for diversity
of the modes of physical access as well as a plethora of applications and
content developed to work with the TCP/IP standard."32 The resulting
explosion of innovative applications on the Internet likely would never
have happened but for the incorporation of the end-to-end design into the
network.3 3 In Wu's words, "The Internet's layered architecture and
embedded end-to-end design have created an Internet where coding power
resides among the designers of applications."34
2. Protocol Layer Models
Since the early 1970s, engineers have developed various network
design models incorporating protocols in a layered manner. While sharing a
common overall structure and philosophy, these protocol layers models
28. Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1163, 1192
(1999).
29. Id.
30. Clark and Blumenthal explain that the end-to-end arguments are a set of design
principles concerning how application requirements should be met in a communications
system. "The end-to-end arguments suggest that specific application-level functions usually
cannot, and preferably should not, be built into the lower levels of the system-the core of
the network." David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, Rethinking the Design of the
Internet: The End to End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, Paper Submitted to the
TPRC 1 (Aug. 8, 2000).
31. Wu, supra note 28, at 1164-65.
32. Weiser, supra note 15, at 4-5.
33.See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era 14 (Stanford Law School, Working Paper
No. 207) (2000), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/e2e/papers/Lemley-Lessig-
e2epaper.pdf (explaining role of "e2e" design in producing the "extraordinary innovation"
of the Internet).
34. Wu, supra note 28, at 1193.
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have been organized in somewhat different ways to serve different
purposes. Two models in particular stand out.
The justly famous "Internet Protocol Suite", introduced in 1974,"5
involves multiple layers riding on separate physical infrastructure. The IP
Suite has become the de facto name for a* family of over 100 data
communications protocols used to organize computer and data
communications equipment into practical computer networks. It has been
noted that there is no standard, universally accepted way to describe the
relevant layers of Internet architecture.3 6 Figure 5 shows one typical four-
layer schematic.
Layers Model of the TCP/IP Suite
Utility Layer HTTP, FTP, DNS ....
Transport Layer TCP, UDP
Network (Internet Protocol) Layer IP, ICMP, IGMP
Link Layer Interface to the Physical Layer
Physical Layer Ethernet, Modem, DSL, Cable, TI, Fiber Optics,Satellite, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi ....
Figure 5
35. See generally, Cerf/Kahn TCP Paper, supra note 25.
36. See, e.g., CRAIG HUNT, TCP/IP NETWORK ADMINISTRATION 8 (1992) (explaining
that with no universal agreement about how to describe the layers of the TCP/IP model, it is
generally viewed as composed of fewer than seven layers); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 101 (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS]
(citation omitted) (explaining that most descriptions of the TCP/IP suite define three to five
functional layers); Shah et al., supra note 26, at 15 (explaining that the TCP/IP protocols
map to a four-layer conceptual model).
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Notably, the data received from the applications at the upper layers is
broken up into data packets to be handed to the TCP/IP layers; conversely,
the data packets received from the TCP/IP layers are assembled into a data
stream to be delivered to the upper layers. In the encapsulation of data,
lower layers treat data passed from upper layers as structureless pure data
("payload"), and place headers and/or trailers around the payload. Several
authors explain that:
The Internet protocols are arranged in essentially independent,
unbundled layers with the Internet Protocol itself at the "waist" of the
stack. The protocol stack broadens above the waist to support a wide
range of transport and application layers including email, the World
Wide Web, file transfer protocols, remote login, etc. The protocol
stack broadens below the waist to ride on a wide range of underlying
networks using a variety of technologies including frame relay, ATM,
ADSL, fiber optic systems, and so on. Modularity promotes fair and
open competition between and among providers of the different layers
by allowing competitors to compete with products that will
interoperate. The modularity/stratification coupled with openness
facilitates the introduction of new transmission technologies and new
applications thereby stimulating innovation.37
Another example of a protocol layers model is the "Open System
Interconnection ('OSI') Reference Model," which was first developed in
1978 by the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") and
provided a conceptual basis for international protocol development and
implementation.38 The OSI Model includes seven embedded layers:
(1) Application Layer: Semantics-includes application
programs such as electronic mail;
(2) Presentation Layer: Syntax-includes functions for basic
encoding rules;
(3) Session Layer: Dialog Coordination-handles application
functionalities;
(4) Transport Layer: Reliable Data Transfer-breaks data into
packets for transport;
(5) Network Layer: Routing and Relaying-handles network
flow of data packets;
(6) Data Link Layer: Technology-Specific Transfer-interfaces
with physical layer; and
(7) Physical Layer: Physical Connections-specifies electrical/
photonic characteristics.
37. Shah et aL, supra note 26, at 13.
38. See JOHN D. SPRAGINS ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROTOCOLS AND DESIGN 14-
15, 118-27 (1991).
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Like the TCP/IP Suite, the OSI Model is layered to segment discrete
functional responsibilities. Each layer represents a function performed
when data is transferred between cooperating applications across the
network. In the resulting vertical hierarchy, the content begins at the top
layer and works down to the lower physical layer for transport to the
ultimate destination, where it then ascends back to the top layer again.39
From these two standardized industry models (of which the TCP/IP
Suite has achieved much more universal acceptance and prominence),4"
others have attempted to glean a common model that incorporates the key
functions of the different layers.4 One of the more recent layering models
has been suggested by Professor Yochai Benkler of New York University,
whom Lawrence Lessig has described as "perhaps the best communications
theorist of our generation."4 The "Benkler Communications System Layers
Model" incorporates the TCP/IP Suite as part of three distinct layers: the
physical infrastructure, the logical/code/applications layer, and the content
layer.43 Figure 6 shows how these three layers of the Benkler model relate
to one another.
39. According to Shah,
Various principles were applied to arrive at the seven layers....
" A layer should be created where a different level of abstraction is needed.
" Each layer should perform a well-defined function.
[.. I
" The layer boundaries should be chosen to minimize the information flow
across the interfaces.
" The number of layers should be large enough that distinct functions need
not be thrown together in the same layer out of necessity, and small
enough that the architecture does not become unwieldy.
Shah et al., supra note 26, at 9 (citation omitted).
40. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 59 n.87 (explaining that TCP/IP, not
OSI, has become the dominant protocols model).
41. See, e.g., NRENAISSANCE COMM., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REALIZING THE
INFORMATION FUTURE: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 47-51 (1994) (proposing an "open data
network architecture," with Network Technology Substrate, ODN Bearer Service,
Transportation Services and Representation Standards, Middleware Services, and
Applications layers).
42. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 23 (2001) [hereinafter LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS].
43. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562
(2000).
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The Benkler Communications System Layers Model
Content Layer
Web Browsers, Email Client Software,
MP3 Software, Word Processors, etc.
HTrP, SMTP, FTP, DNS, etc.
TCP, UDP
IP, ICMP, IGMP
Interface to the Physical Layer
Ethernet, Modem, DSL, Cable, TI,
Fiber Optics, Satellite, Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi, etc.
Physical Layer
Figure 6"
Text, Speech, Music, Pictures, Video, etc.
In all of these engineering-based models, the fundamental point is that
the horizontal layers, defined by code or software, serve as the functional
components of an end-to-end communications system.45 Each layer
operates on its own terms, with its own unique rules and constraints, and
interfaces with other layers in carefully defined ways.
44. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 28.
45. It must be noted that these various models are somewhat oversimplified for cases
where IP overlays Frame Relay, Asynchronous Transfer Mode ("ATM"), Multi Protocol
Label Switching ("MPLS"), and other types of networks.
Logical / Code Layer
Application / Services
Utility Protocol Layer
TCP / IP Transport Layer
Protocol Suite Network Layer
Link Layer
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C. The Internet Era: Legal Walls Stay Up as Logical Walls Come
Down
1. The Communications World
As the 1990s unfolded, political interest in adopting a modem
telecommunications law increased. In 1994, while the outline of a new
federal statute was beginning to take shape in Congress, the Clinton
Administration proposed adding another title to the Communications Act.
Title VII would have established a new overarching regulatory paradigm
governing all "two-way, broadband, interactive, switched, digital
transmission services," regardless of the underlying technology.46 Some
subsequently have labeled the Title VII initiative "tremendously
ambitious,"47 while others see it as merely another example of "incremental
adaptation of past rules."48 With concerted industry opposition, however,
the end result was a stalled effort on the Title VII approach,4 9 and eventual
adoption two years later of the Telecommunications Act.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, while largely sticking to the
legacy regulatory "silo" regime, took a small step towards the horizontally
layered engineering world in several respects. Most importantly, the 1996
Act largely adopted the basic/enhanced services split, in the guise of
"telecommunications service" and "information service,"5 thereby
affirming the rich legacy of the Computer Inquiry decisions. In addition,
new Section 706 (adopted only as a footnote to the U.S. Code, and not as a
separate title unto itself) focused on "encourag[ing] the deployment" of
46. THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER ON COMMUNICATIONS ACT
REFORMS (1994), available at http:l/www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/political-science/
internet-related/NII-white-paper.
47. Nakahata, supra note 3, at 129.
48. Bar & Sandvig, supra note 2, at 2. Indeed, the authors criticize both the FCC's
Computer Inquiry rules and the failed Title VII proposal as inherently flawed. They argue
that both approaches to the crisis of convergence-fitting new communication services into
existing categories (the Computer Inquiries) and establishing new categories for new
services (the ill-fated Title VII approach in 1994)-suffer from the same shortcomings of
proposing "marginal adjustments to a system anchored in particular technological
implementations of communications services, rather than starting from any fundamental
purpose of communication policy." Id. at 19.
49. As Bar and Sandvig report, "the attempt was quickly killed by telcos and cable
operators who feared losing the advantages each saw in the established regimes." Bar &
Sandvig, supra note 2, at 2 n.3. See also Nakahata, supra note 3, at 129 (the Title VII
proposal "had something for everyone to hate").
50. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46), (20) (2003); Implementation of the Non-Accounting
Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, First Report and
Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, paras. 102-105, 5
Comm. Reg.2nd 696 (1996) [hereinafter Non-Accounting Safeguards Order].
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what Congress called "advanced telecommunications capability."'" This
capability supports a panoply of "voice, data, graphics, and video
telecommunications," but "using any technology" and "without regard to
any transmission media or technology."52 The apparent separation between
the wide range of services and applications, and the agnostic physical
networks involved, appears to be informed in part by the brief legislative
battle over the Title VII proposal.
In a slightly different bent, Section 251 of the 1996 Act created a new
network unbundling regime that focuses both on the physical infrastructure
that comprises monopoly local exchange networks (local loops, local
switches, transport facilities), and all the vertical capabilities that come
with those Unbundled Network Elements ("UNEs").53 Under Section 271
of the 1996 Act, the Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs") are allowed to
provide a previously-barred category of services (voice and data in-region
long-distance service) in exchange for allowing competitors to access and
utilize underlying local network functionalities. 54
Despite these uncharacteristic variations, however, the 1996 Act
largely retained the preexisting vertical legal walls separating various
services and applications/networks from each other. 5 A recent report by
the National Research Council opines that the 1996 Act for the most part
"assumes the continued existence of a number of distinct services that run
over distinct communications technologies and separate infrastructure,"
and thus "does not fully reflect the converged nature of broadband
(different communications infrastructure are able to deliver a similar set of
services using a common platform, the Internet)."56 As attorney John
Nakahata puts it, "the 1996 Act only started the work of reforming our
51. 47 U.S.C. § 157 (2003).
52. Id.
53. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2003). Werbach reports that the 1996 Act's unbundling regime
was founded on the FCC's earlier concept of Open Network Architecture ("ONA"),
intended originally as a form of modular network unbundling to benefit enhanced service
providers. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 61.
54. 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
55. See Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 retained the silo model of communications policy);
Weiser, supra note 15, at I 1 (explaining that the 1996 Act "did not disturb a category-based
regulatory strategy").
56. COMM. ON BROADBAND LAST MILE TECH., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BROADBAND:
BRINGING HOME THE BITS 32 (2002), available at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309082730/html/index.html.
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communications laws to truly harmonize the diversity of regulation among
information platforms."57
Meanwhile, the FCC continues to retain its basic/enhanced dichotomy
and fundamental nondiscriminatory unbundling requirement through the
various Computer Inquiry proceedings. Even when the Commission
replaced the BOCs' structural separation requirements with nonstructural
safeguards, it affirmed and strengthened the requirement that the BOCs
acquire transmission capacity for their own enhanced services operations
under the same tariffed terms and conditions as competitive ESPs.5s
Following passage of the Telecommunications Act, the FCC found that the
preexisting Computer Inquiry requirements are consistent with the statute,
and continue to govern BOC provision of information services.5 9 The
Commission explained that the Computer Inquiry-based rules are "the only
regulatory means by which certain independent ISPs are guaranteed
nondiscriminatory access to BOC local exchange services used in the
provision of intraLATA information services."60
In a 1998 report to Congress on universal service, the FCC
summarized its regulatory philosophy (apparently informed by layers
thinking) in this regard:
Communications networks function as overlapping layers, with
multiple providers often leveraging a common infrastructure. As long
as the underlying market for provision of transmission facilities is
competitive or is subject to sufficient pro-competitive safeguards, we
see no need to regulate the enhanced functionalities that can be built on
top of those facilities .... As an empirical matter, the level of
competition, innovation, investment, and growth in the enhanced
services industry over the past two decades provides a strong
endorsement for such an approach."'"
57. Nakahata, supra note 3, at 97. As will be discussed infra Part III.E, in contrast the
European Union had adopted a comprehensive regulatory framework that encompasses a
technology-neutral model relying in part on the horizontal network layers concept.
58. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace,
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Report
and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, para. 4, 23 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 641 (2001) [hereinafter
CPE/Enhanced Services Bundling Order]; see Cannon, supra note 13, at 200.
59. Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, supra note 50, paras. 132, 135, 136.
60. Id. para. 134
61. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 11 F.C.C.R.
11501, para. 95, 11 Comm. Reg.2nd 1339 (1998) [hereinafter FCC Report to Congress].
The FCC also has acknowledged that the Internet is a "global information system [that]
provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered
on the communications and related infrastructure ...... Inquiry Concerning High-Speed
Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facils., Declaratory Ruling and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, para. I n. 1 (2002).
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In 2001, the FCC emphasized the continued retention of the
"fundamental provisions" contained in the Computer Inquiry decisions
"that facilities-based carriers continue to offer the underlying transmission
service on nondiscriminatory terms, and that competitive enhanced services
providers should therefore continue to have access to this critical input. 62
In particular, the Commission stressed, "the separate availability of the
transmission service is fundamental to ensuring that dominant carriers
cannot discriminate against customers who do not purchase all the
components of a bundle from the carriers, themselves."63 Thus, the FCC
repeatedly and forcefully has acknowledged the "fundamental provisions"
of the Computer Inquiry decisions that protect an ESP's ability to access
lower level transmission services as a "critical input." As will be seen
below, that position is now under severe challenge by the very same agency
that originally promulgated and defended it.'
2. The Internet World
Meanwhile, on the supposedly unregulated Internet side of the
basic/enhanced services divide, vertically-inclined legal precedent was
being established by Congress, the courts, and the states. Since the rise of
the commercial Internet in the early 1990s, ISPs have found themselves
being held legally responsible for the actions of third parties utilizing their
networks. Under this new concept of "ISP liability," providers of wholesale
and retail network connectivity are deemed responsible for the content
exchanged and applications provided by end-user customers and
unaffiliated third parties.
Congress first addressed the issue squarely in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") of 1998, where ISPs were granted limited legal
immunity in exchange for removing infringing material that resides on their
networks once an appropriate notice is received from the copyright holder
or its legitimate agent. This regime, commonly referred to as a "notice and
takedown" requirement, seeks to balance the interests of the ISPs as
information conduits, while protecting the owners of copyrighted material
from continual infringement. The DMCA further attempts to balance
competing interests by giving the alleged infringers an opportunity to
challenge the claim of the assumed copyright holder.65
62. CPE/Enhanced Services Bundling Order, supra note 58, para. 12.
63. Id. para. 44 (footnote omitted).
64. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2003).
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Since enactment of the DMCA, however, ISPs increasingly have been
under legal, financial, and political pressure to account for the actions of
users of the Internet over whom they have little or no control.66 Some
recent examples include: (1) the Recording Industry Association of
America's ("RIAA") efforts to obtain private customer information from
Verizon, without an appropriate judicial subpoena to track down supposed
users of peer-to-peer networks; (2) demands from the Attorney General of
Pennsylvania for ISPs to block access to users throughout North America
to numerous websites, including countless legitimate ones, so that a site
allegedly involving child pornography would not be accessible by residents
of Pennsylvania; and (3) a French court's holding that a U.S.-based ISP is
legally liable under French law for third parties selling Nazi memorabilia
via its website.67
III. A NEW CONCEPT: REGULATION ALONG HORIZONTAL
NETWORK LAYERS
The concept of separating out that which needs to be regulated, and
that which needs little or no regulation, is a sound one. In the Author's
view, the fundamental organizing principles themselves must be
reexamined in light of the coming IP-centric world. Kevin Werbach insists
that the nation's communications policies need to be reformulated with the
Internet at the center, because communications policy inevitably will
become a mere subset of Internet policy.68 Of course, even if it were not
premised on the engineering protocols established by the TCP/IP suite, the
layering concept would have considerable relevance with regard to any
kind of electronic communications network.69 Nonetheless, given the self-
evident dynamics of digital transformation and a networked world,7 ° and
the market reality of companies and individuals converging to common IP
platforms, the discussion below is focused on drawing public policy lessons
from Internet topology and experience.
66. For a detailed account of this subject, see generally TIMOTHY D. CASEY, ISP
LIABILITY SURVIVAL GUIDE: STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING COPYRIGHT, SPAM, CACHE, AND
PRIVACY REGULATIONS xix (2000) (a practical guide for "understanding, complying, or
otherwise dealing with existing and ongoing efforts to control or regulate the Internet").
67. See infra Part III.A. for a further discussion of these and other recent examples.
68. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 38, 46.
69. Indeed, as Craig McTaggart reminds us, "[t]elephone and Internet traffic are often
carried over the same physical wires and cables. They are simply encoded using different
technical protocols at the logical layer." Craig McTaggert, A Layered Approach to Internet
Legal Analysis 5 (Dec. 21, 2002) (unpublished article), available at
http://www.innovationlaw.org/cmi/ilg2002/reading/ayeredl.pdf.
70. Weiser, supra note 15, at 10 (explaining that there are two fundamental dynamics of
the Information Age-digital transformation and a networked world).
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A. Sketching the Layers Framework
Given the growing number of complex legal problems that have
developed concerning IP-based networks, services, and applications, it is
not surprising that a small but well-respected cadre of academics and expert
analysts has begun suggesting the creation of a new legal regime. This
approach is informed by the horizontal protocol layers first formulated by
network engineers over thirty years ago, as well as the partial layered
regulatory scheme adopted by the FCC in its Computer Inquiry decisions.
This Part briefly discusses many of the major problems with the current
legal system, weighs the pros and cons of a layered framework, and
suggests the outline of a new layered model.
1. Why Adopt a Layers Approach?
Initially, commentators have pointed out some of the obvious intrinsic
flaws in the current U.S. "silos"-based legal and regulatory regime. Kevin
Werbach puts it succinctly when he observes that the basic problem is that
"[t]he hermetically-sealed categories at the core of the [vertical] approach
are foreign to the Internet.' '"' More precisely, he identifies four fundamental
problems with the current regulatory approach: it assumes distinctions
between individual services are clear (in the IP world any network can
carry virtually any kind of traffic); it applies most rules in an all-or-nothing
fashion (many IP services bear indicia of more than one regulatory
category); it looks at each service category in isolation (increasingly all
networks are interconnected, and the critical policy issues concern the
terms of such interconnection); and it concentrates on the services
ultimately provided to end users (competitive dynamics are increasingly
driven by behind-the-scenes network architectures).,
Douglas Sicker finds no fewer than nine separate problems created by
the current legal and regulatory regime when applied to the IP world,
including: (1) interconnection distortions (ISPs have no carrier rights to
interconnect with ILECs); (2) universal service concerns (current model
conflates the network with the applications); (3) bundling discriminations
(certain players can restrict access to content); (4) content discrimination
(certain players can dictate the terms of content and conduit delivery); (5)
accessibility concerns (only traditional voice service providers are
obligated to facilitate accessibility for individuals with disabilities); (6)
security concerns (wiretapping applies only to traditional voice services);
(7) safety concerns (only certain players are required to support emergency
71. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 47.
72. Id. at 58.
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service); (8) market distortion (price does not reflect cost of service); and
(9) investment and deployment distortion (providers make investment
choices based on policy).73
Rob Frieden adds that U.S. telecommunications law and policy
historically has been "based on fixed service definitions and relatively
static assumptions about the industrial organization of telecommunications
and information processing."74 Technological innovations and industry
developments jeopardize the non-convergent "Old World Order"
dichotomies.75
On the flip-side, commentators over the past several years have
presented compelling arguments in favor of the wholesale adoption of a
public policy paradigm that relies on the network layers model. In general
terms, as Canadian Craig McTaggart indicates, "The analysis of Internet
legal issues can be aided by an understanding of the Internet's unique
layered architecture."76 Robert Entman summed up the consensus at the
Aspen Institute Conference on Telecommunications Policy in August 2000
with the observation that "conceptually distinguishing the technical layers
of the system offers a new paradigm that can clarify regulatory problems
and point to their solutions."77 Sicker offers that the model "does not
necessarily provide the policy answers, but it provides a framework for
better resolving policy issues. '"78
Entman goes on to explain that the power of making conceptual
layers distinctions lies in the insights they generate about public policy
towards telecommunications. In particular, (1) applications should be
separated conceptually from transport and from content; (2) higher degrees
of competition may be more feasible and desirable at some layers than
others, so that encouraging robust competition at the applications level may
yield more consumer benefits than trying to stimulate multiple competitive
transport networks; and (3) policymakers can choose their battles more
73. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 6-8.
74. Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications
Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach, 55 FED. COMM.
L.J. 207, 209 (2003).
75. Id; see also Bar & Sandvig, supra note 2, at 17 ("[A] single infrastructure, the
[l]nternet, now offers the range of applications that once existed in distinct domains,
governed by different policies reflecting different compromises between control and access.
In addition, the Internet also brings about new applications that defy classification .....
76. McTaggart, supra note 69, at 1.
77. ROBERT M. ENTMAN, TRANSITION TO AN IP ENVIRONMENT: A REPORT OF THE
FIFTEENTH ANNUAL ASPEN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 1
(2001), available at http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/enr04/enr04.pdf.
78. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 9.
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selectively, targeting those points in the layers where promoting
competitiveness will yield the most efficient result. 9
Kevin Werbach makes four points about the benefits of what he calls
the vertical (and others call the horizontal) approach. Such an approach: (1)
removes the assumption that service boundaries are clear and are tied to
physical network boundaries; (2) implies a more granular analysis within
each layer; (3) brings to the forefront the issue of interconnection between
networks and between functional layers within those networks; and (4)
recognizes the significance of network architecture as a determining factor
in shaping business dynamics."0 As a result, he calls for regulation to track
the architectural model of the Internet itself, both its end-to-end nature and
its layered protocol stack.8'
Robert Cannon explains how a proper application of layering
concepts yields a number of important public policy benefits:
[D]iffering layers demarcate natural boundaries between markets.
These market boundaries permit communications regulation, where
necessary, to be particularly successful. By conceptualizing the policy
as layers, the analyst is capable of grouping and segregating issues.
Issues related to the physical network layer (i.e., common carrier
regulation, spectrum policy, cable franchises) are different from those
of the logical layer (i.e., open access, peering) and are different from
those in the content layer (i.e., intellectual property, gambling,
taxation, libel). Thus, by conceptualizing the policy as layers, the
analyst is enabled to identify markets, clarify issues, create boundary
regulations that are effective, and, in so doing, target solutions where
issues reside without interfering with other industries and
opportunities. The Layered Model is a market policy mapped onto a
technical conception. 82
Sicker observes that dividing the model horizontally allows us to
"separate service aspects of the network in a manner consistent with the
design of [the] network."83 The real value is that "regulation can be
minimized or compartmentalized by considering the role of regulation on
each layer distinct from the layer above or below it."84 Frieden believes that
"a horizontal orientation would trigger a substantial revamping of
regulatory treatment as it would possibly free some ventures that have
historically operated under extensive regulation, even as it imposes new
79. ENTMAN, supra note 77, at 2-3.
80. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 67.
81. Id.
82. Cannon, supra note 13, at 195.
83. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 9.
84. Id..
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regulatory burdens on ventures historically exempt from regulation."85
Such a horizontal orientation also "would establish a regulatory regime
based on how technologies function and would foreclose the need to make
semantic distinctions between such converging concepts as
telecommunications used in the provision of information services and
telecommunications services provided directly to users."86
Commentators focus in particular on the valuable ways that a layered
approach can help uncover and deal with market power issues. Sicker
states, for example, that providers at the lower layer should be "regulated
differently from [each other], not on the basis of network type, but rather
on the basis of market power."8 7 Entman reports that participants at the
Aspen Institute's 2000 telecommunications conference found the use of the
four-layer framework "an invaluable tool for crafting more calibrated pro-
competition policies."88 In particular, the multi-layered approach allows
policymakers to shift their focus, which traditionally is on regulation of the
voice application, to regulation of transport. The primary public policy goal
is to encourage efficiency in innovation, by ensuring a lack of artificial
barriers to entry of innovative technologies and services. Competition itself
is not a policy goal, Entman states, but rather merely a means to stimulate
and direct market forces that help attain the primary goals. Recognizing the
distinctions among layers will help achieve optimal levels of competition.
"Each layer needs to be analyzed separately in terms of bottlenecks that
exist or might arise to stymie competition," given the fact that each layer
has different economies of scale, and economies of scope may cross
layers.8 9
As with any analytical tool, the layers principle is not without its
drawbacks. To date, however, most of the concerns raised in the academic
literature come from otherwise committed supporters of the principle, and
go more to process and political issues than to any significant substantive
reservations. Lingering ambiguities include: (1) developing the optimal
way to translate valuable insights into concrete and effective policy rules,9"
(2) devising empirically based tests for market power and monopoly
abuses, (3) establishing tough enforcement mechanisms to minimize delays
and "gaming of the process," 9' (4) defining and implementing a realistic
85. Frieden, supra note 74, at 213-214.
86. Frieden, supra note 74, at 214.
87. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 9.
88. Entman, supra note 77, at 6.
89. Id. at 13-14.
90. Id. at 15.
91. Id; see also Michael J. Weisman, The Regulation of a Layered Regulatory
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transition strategy to a comprehensive new framework,92 and (5)
determining how to grant policymakers broad authority to make the
necessary comprehensive statutory and regulatory changes.93 While
challenging and deserving of careful attention, none of these concerns
appears insurmountable.
Another potential drawback, in the Author's view, centers on the
possibility that a layers-informed legal framework could be transformed by
some into a rigid and inflexible mandate. At its core, the layers principle is
a pragmatic tool, based on a close analysis of technological and
marketplace realities. In adopting, applying, and enforcing a layers-based
approach, policymakers should take care not to enshrine it as either
definitive or dispositive in each and every situation.
A more straightforward objection is a political one, namely that a
layered approach is simply too extreme a change to garner the political
support to make the necessary legal and regulatory revisions. For example,
John Nakahata, otherwise a proponent of the concept, opines that from an
institutional perspective a "'bottoms-up' statutory overhaul" focused on a
functional layers approach is "a fundamental, radical change."'94 The
layered approach, however, has been shown not to be that different in
concept from the FCC's basic/enhanced distinction, or the impetus behind
the failed Title VII regime. Douglas Sicker insists that "[o]ne of the
strongest motivations for moving toward the proposed framework is that
there exists significant precedence. It is not a radical departure from the
basic regulatory structure and precedent of the last four decades." " Thus, it
appears that the layered model is not such a novel concept after all, but
rather a refinement and extension of the FCC's preexisting basic/enhanced
dichotomy.
Approach to E-Mail, Internet Radio and IP Telephony 30 (Mar. 2002) (unpublished essay
submitted to Professor Toshiko Takanaka, University of Washington School of Law)
(stating that changes proposed by advocates of the layered model "would only be possible in
an atmosphere of aggressive antitrust enforcement"), available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/classes/Layeredregulationpaper.pdf.
92. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 54-64; Douglas C. Sicker & Joshua L.
Mindel, Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy, I J. ON
TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 69, 71, 85, 92-93.
93. See J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the United States of the European
Union's Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications, at 28 (FCC, OPP
Working Paper Series No. 36) (2002); Nakahata, supra note 3, at 97; Frieden, supra note 74,
at 249.
94. Nakahata, supra note 3, at 130.
95. Douglas C. Sicker, Applying a Layered Policy Model to IP Based Voice Services,
IEEE COMPUTER SOC'Y, PROCS. OF THE 36m HAWAII INT'L CONF. ON SYSTEMS SCIENCES
(HICSS '03), at 8 (2002) [hereinafter Sicker, Layered Policy Model].
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Moreover, several farsighted regulators already have acknowledged
the compelling need for a new regulatory paradigm that reflects the reality
of the IP world. In recent months, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell has
expressed the desire to embrace "Internet-premised, Internet-based IP type
communications" and "tailor a set of regulatory clothing uniquely for it."96
More explicitly, Chairman Powell discusses the need to "build from a
blank slate up as opposed to from the myriad of telecommunications
regulations down," so that one can "make each regulatory judgment as the
consequence of forethought and judgment and understanding about this
specific technology."97 In contrast, he notes, "there is no clear answer in the
statute, the statute is in its little buckets, and the buckets don't make
sense."98 Elsewhere, Chairman Powell again invokes the imperative to
"establish a rational policy environment for IP-based services to continue
to evolve," informed by "the recognition that the Internet is inherently a
global network that does not acknowledge narrow, artificial boundaries."9 9
Robert Pepper, Chief of Policy Development at the FCC, explained in
a recent interview how the network layered concept represents a different
approach in Washington, D.C., but one that may only require some further
education of policymakers:
We're seeing a significant shift in the telecom industry's underlying
technology as we move from circuits to packets and from a traditional
architecture to one where all forms of traffic ultimately ride over
IP.... Now, there are people in Washington who don't understand a
great deal about the technology or even the concept of the layered
approach to communications networks and services. The idea that you
could have a transport link that is independent of sound or analog
waves is new to them .... It's a completely different way of thinking
about our networks. In many respects it all really comes down to an
issue of educating people.'0°
96.Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, at the Meeting of the Technology
Advisory Council 1 (Oct. 20, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-241750A 1 .pdf.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id.
99. Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, at the FCC Forum on Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) 1 (Dec. 1, 2003), available at http:/lhraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-241775Al.pdf; see also Statement of Chairman Michaei K.
Powell, IP-Enabled Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, WC Docket No. 04-36 (Mar.
10, 2004) at 2, available at http:/lhraunfoss.fcc.govledocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-04-
28Al.pdf [hereinafter IP-Enabled Services NPRM] ("[W]e simply cannot contort the
character of the Internet to suit our familiar notions of regulation. We will not dumb down
the genius of the [W]eb to match the limited vision of a regulator.").
100. Jeff Pulver, VON Pioneers: Robert Pepper of the FCC, VON MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec.
2003, at 13-14.
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Some leading regulators have publicly advocated adoption of a layers
model. As one example, Brett Perlman, then-Commissioner of the Public
Utility Commission of Texas, told FCC Commissioner Kevin Martin in
January 2003 that the FCC could meet its goals of encouraging broadband
competition and network investment "if it were to apply a 'layered model'
to broadband infrastructure. 10' Commissioner Perlman went on to note that
the layered model "has been discussed in several recent legal and technical
articles and is consistent with the underlying protocols governing the
Internet."102
Thus, while the political, institutional, and educational challenges
cannot be underestimated, the layers model represents a shift in thinking
that successfully mirrors the way that networks and markets actually
operate. Adoption of a layering framework would be a logical extension of
recent technology and policy insights to the broader areas of
telecommunications and Internet law. 0
3
2. What Kind of Layers Model to Adopt?
While there are obvious commonalities among them, different layers
models have been proposed by a number of commentators. A natural
starting point is determining exactly how many layers to identify and
include in a conceptual model. Many see a logical grouping of four
different protocol layers.' ° In particular, Entman indicates that for purposes
of public policy, it might suffice to distinguish four layers: content,
applications, network, and data link. Content describes the actual
information transmitted (e.g., voice conversation, e-commerce transactions,
video streams). Applications denotes the nature of the service provided
(e.g., voice, video). Data links, also called interconnection points, are used
for routing protocols and packet structure, fiber, copper, and coaxial
101. Letter from Brett Perlman, Commissioner, Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, to The
Honorable Kevin Martin, Commissioner, FCC 3-4 (Jan. 28, 2003) (on file with the Journal).
102. Id. at 4 (footnote omitted). After discussing the model in some detail, Perlman
observes that application of the model would allow regulation based on a "market power"
test, not on types of networks or services, so that network access and unbundling
requirements would apply to any broadband provider with market power. Id.
103. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 12.
104. See, e.g., TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND
ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 129-30 (1999) (describing
four horizontal layers in the Web's infrastructure: "the transmission medium, the computer
hardware, the software, and the content"); LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supra note 36,
at 101 (discussing four layers: applications, transport, network, and data-link, with content
layer included in what others call the application layer); Werbach, A Layered Model, supra
note 2, at 59 (using a four layers model: content, applications or services, logical
infrastructure, physical infrastructure).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
cable.1°5  McTaggart also finds four readily separable layers:
content/transaction layer, application layer, logical layer, and physical
layer. 10 6 Others see only three layers necessary for a viable model.0 7 Sicker
concludes that the generalized horizontal policy model has either three or
four layers: applications, transport, access, and an optional content layer.0 8
Still others go up to six layers, 109 or even seven."0  Finally, some
have suggested a two-layered approach, which creates two broad categories
of facilities and infrastructure versus applications and services.
As Sicker aptly points out, the goal of adopting a layers model is to
"create a framework that logically divides a network (and services provided
over that network) so that policy can then be applied in a more consistent
manner."' Thus, public policy considerations should be taken into account
when deciding where and how to divide up the protocol layers. Sicker
warns us in particular not to be too tightly wedded to the specifics of any
particular protocols model. The specifications of the TCP/IP suite deal with
the technical characteristics of the protocol, but not necessarily with the
business or policy characteristics. "[W]e should not confuse the technical
implementation of the Internet with the policy goals of a layered model.
What we should take away from the protocol design is its design
philosophy; including things like decentralized control, autonomy,
efficiency, etc."" 2
A number of useful observations can be gleaned from the various
commentators. First and foremost, there is an obvious separation between
the upper applications layer and the lower physical layer. Economist
Michael Katz uses "de-lamination" as a term to describe this fundamental
105. ENTMAN, supra note 77, at 2.
106. McTaggart, supra note 69, at 1.
107. Bar and Sandvig see a "fundamental separability" between three network
components: physical hardware, control software, and communications applications." Bar &
Sandvig, supra note 2, at 21. As discussed earlier, the Benkler model adopts a three-layer
approach (content, logical or code, and physical). Benkler, supra note 43, at 562.
108. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 10-11.
109. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 32-33 (describing the six layers, which are
content, application, transport, IP, link, and physical).
110. Shah, Sicker, and Hatfield propose a model that closely resembles a traditional
protocol stack but adds a Layer 0 to represent the physical and power-related issues not
generally captured in Layer 1, and also adds a Layer 6 to include issues beyond the layered
model and other nonconforming topics (process issues such as standards participation and
interconnection negotiations). Shah et al., supra note 26, at 16.
111. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 12.
112. Id. at lO.
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separation of applications from transport. 113 Second, we should identify
separate layers for content and for applications, per Entman, and Sicker, to
better help analyze e-commerce and ISP liability issues. Third, as Werbach
points out, even though the "[pihysical and logical infrastructure are tightly
coupled" in the voice public switched telephone network ("PSTN"), they
remain distinct and separated as engineering concepts.'14 Fourth, it is useful
to separate out the software that routes network traffic (the logical layer)
from the software that is exposed to end users (the application layer).1 15
Fifth, McTaggart suggests a further refinement of the content layer,
including the notion of "transactions" in order to encompass the full range
of activities possible on the Internet.'16 He defines content as "information
which is available on or obtainable by means of, the Internet," whereas
transactions are the dynamic interactions carried out over the Internet.117
Finally, Sicker observes the need to identify two different physical
layer networks, the access and the transport. He believes that it is critical to
separate the access network (the physical "edge" of the communications
network, typically thought of as last-mile telephone facilities provided by
local exchange carriers) from the transport network (the physical "core" of
the network, typically thought of as long-haul telecommunications
provided by interexchange carriers) for a horizontal public policy model to
succeed.118 Through regulation or economic incentive, the proper means
can be introduced to encourage providers of various services to
interconnect on reasonable terms. Where a provider owns multiple layers,
Sicker explains, regulation might be imposed to ensure that this player
provides reasonable interconnection. Although other models tend not to
consider the issues of interconnection, market power, or the transition to
such a layered model, each of these issues is critical in creating a workable
model. In short, the separation described between the access and transport
providers maps to the actual design of existing communications
networks.1'9
113. Michael L. Katz, Thoughts on the Implications of Technological Change for
Telecommunications Policy, in TRANSITION TO AN IP ENVIRONMENT, A REPORT OF THE
FIFTEENTH ANNUAL ASPEN INSTITUTE CONFERENCE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
(2001) 25-26 (2001).
114. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 61 n.91.
115. Id. at 60 n.89.
116. McTaggart, supra note 69, at 5.
117. Id. at 9.
118. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 11.
119. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 10-12.
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Thus, incorporating many of these important public policy-related
insights, the Author proposes to adopt the Network Layers Model as shown
in Figure 7.
Proposed Network Layers Model
Figure 7120
B. Solum's "Layers Principle"
The next step is to consider some of the primary analytical elements
of the Author's proposed network layers model. Professor Lawrence Solum
of Loyola Marymount University, along with consultant Minn Chung,
recently published an extensive paper that lays out some of the fundamental
concepts to support a proposed new public policy framework.'21 After
describing Professor Solum's approach in some detail, the Author adopts
and supplements his key principles and then extends them to apply to
specific examples in the public policy world of IP-based services and
applications.
Professor Solum relies in part on the leading work of Professor
Lawrence Lessig and his so-called "code thesis," which in its essence
120. Source: Author.
121. Solum & Chung, supra note 1.
Content/Transactions Layer
Applications Layer
Logical Network Layer
Physical Network Layer
Transport
Access
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describes how computer software is the prime regulator of the Internet.'22
He explains that the architecture of the Internet has profound implications
for its legal regulation. Under the "end-to-end" principle described earlier,
the Internet is viewed as a combination of a stupid network and smart
applications. As Lessig makes clear, the Internet is transparent to
applications (i.e., does not associate data packets with application file
types), and this transparency is a built-in characteristic of the layered
architecture of the Internet. "'23
Professor Solum calls his key concept the "layers principle," which
amounts to the general exhortation to "respect the integrity of the
layers."'124 Solum's layers principle can be defined by the following
statement: "Public Internet regulators should not adopt legal regulations of
the Internet (including statutes, regulations, common law rules, or
interpretations of any of these) that violate the integrity of the [layered
mature of Internet architecture], absent a compelling regulatory interest
and consideration of layer-respecting alternatives. "125
In his paper, Professor Solum describes two interrelated corollaries in
support of his layers principle:
Corollary One: The Principle of Layers Separation
Regulation should not violate or compromise the separation
between layers designed into the basic infrastructure of the Internet,
so that one layer of the Internet would differentiate the handling of
data on the basis of information available only at another layer,
absent a compelling regulatory interest.'2 6
Corollary Two: The Principle of Minimizing Layer Crossing
If compelling regulatory interests require a layer-crossing regulation,
"that regulation should [minimize] the distance between the layer at which
the law aims to produce an effect and the layer directly targeted by legal
regulation."' 27
Solum indicates that two theses form the supporting pillars that
provide a compelling justification for the layers principle and its two
foundational corollaries, the transparency thesis and the fit thesis.'28
122. Id.; LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS, supra note 36, at 30-60.
123. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 42, at 34-37. For example, the TCP/IP
protocol is independent from the underlying computer hardware or operating system. See
STEVENS, supra note 27, at 5.
124. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 29.
125. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 29-31, 42-43.
127. Id. at43.
128. Id. at 51-52.
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The Transparency Thesis: "The fact that layer violating regulations
inherently damage the transparency of the Internet, combined with the fact
that Internet transparency lowers the barriers to innovation, provides
compelling support for the principle of layer separation ... ." 29
The Fit Thesis: "The fact that layer-crossing regulations result in an
inherent mismatch between the ends such regulations seek to promote and
the means employed implies that layer-crossing regulations suffer from
problems of overbreadth and underinclusion... , "'0 To avoid these
problems, Internet regulators are required to abide by the principle of
minimizing layer-crossing regulations. 3'
Solum explains that the layers principle rests on a solid foundation of
engineering facts and norms because "the layers are separated for sound
reasons of network engineering."'32 As we have seen previously, each layer
depends on lower ones; to avoid replicating functions in higher layers, one
should put in a lower layer to serve all higher layers. As a result, functions
normally should not cross layers unless there is an exceptional reason to do
so. In Solum's view, "horizontal communication requires vertical
transparency.' 3 3 Professor Solum continues, "The lower layer, by design,
cannot or is not supposed to discriminate the payload from the upper layer
based on its content, or modify the content."' 34 He points out that "the
lower layer is transparent with respect to the upper layer."' 35 Transparency
means that the Internet is a neutral platform; anyone can develop network
applications with or on top of the TCP/IP protocol, with no permission
necessary. 136
Solum's proposed six-layer model includes the content, application,
transport, network (IP), link, and physical layers.'37 In his model, the public
conduit function of the Internet operates mainly at the IP layer and the
physical layer below it. The IP layer is the greatest common denominator
of the publicly shared resources on the Internet. It is the function of the IP
layer, along with the "stupid" hop-by-hop routing design, that fuses
multitudes of disparate networks into an apparently single, unified,
seamless network. 38
129. Id. at 52.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 51-53.
132. Id. at 25.
133. Id. at 26.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 25-27.
137. Id. at 27-28.
138. Id. at 26-28.
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C. The Layers Principle and Informed Decisionmaking
In Professor Solum's view, applying the layers analysis (by
identifying the layer of the problem conduct and the layer where the
regulation operates) provides a more concrete analysis of the issues by
placing the disputed function at a proper layer and providing a correct
focus on the relevant operation of the Internet. In essence, the legal
regulation can only be as effective as is permitted by the architecture of the
Internet. And, in turn, the nature and limitations of the legal regulation will
be determined by the nature of the code being implemented.'39
Solum discusses the proper role of policymakers and regulators in
determining whether or not to adopt and enforce a regulation that affects
the Internet. Initially he defends the need for regulators to utilize the layers
principle in fashioning policy, as opposed to using a more case-by-case,
incremental approach. 140 In a nutshell, his case against "incrementalism"
revolves around: (1) "the tyranny of small decisions,"' 41 (2) ignorance of
unforeseen and unintended consequences; (3) damage to the transparency
of the Internet inherent in the nature of the layers-violating regulations, (4)
Kenneth Arrow's "information paradox,"' 142 and (5) institutional capacity
(regulators are ill-prepared to understand Internet architecture).143
Solum also states that the layers principle and its corollaries should be
treated by prospective regulators as presumptive rules of decisions.
"[B]efore adopting a layer-violating regulation, a regulator must articulate
a compelling regulatory justification."'" At a minimum, "decision makers
should be required to consider the availability of layer respecting
alternatives."' 45
The layers principle also can be employed as an aid to statutory
interpretation. For example, as part of explicating the meaning of "the
public interest" standard in the Communications Act,'46 "the layers
principle can give more particular and concrete meaning to the ambiguous
139. Id. at 28-29.
140. Id. at 38-41.
141. Id. at 34.
142. Arrow's paradox is that we cannot know the innovation costs of damaging the
transparency of the Internet, but we must consider those costs when formulating Internet
regulatory policy. See id. at 36.
143. Id. at 33-38.
144. Id. at 39 (emphasis omitted).
145. Id. at 40 (emphasis omitted).
146. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 310(d) (2000).
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statutory command."'47 The layers principle can also be used to fill
statutory gaps and to narrow or broaden legal text where appropriate. 148
Finally, Solum recognizes that the layers principle is only as valid as
the network engineering concepts that inform it. As he puts it:
The layers principle is supported by sound considerations of network
engineering. But there is no reason to believe that these principles of
network design are written in stone for all time. As the Internet
evolves, it is possible that superior architectures may be conceived.
Moreover, just as the Internet changed the total electronic
communications system, there may be similar revolutionary
innovations in the future. 149
Thus, the layers principle should be viewed as far more than merely
provisional, but something less than absolute.
D. Another Public Interest Aspect: Creating and Preserving The
"Innovation Engine"
Commentators also draw interesting public policy lessons from the
robust innovation evidenced on the Internet. To many, policymakers must
ensure that the upper layers of content and applications remain competitive
and free from any untoward influence, from either public (government) or
private (corporate) actors. As one example, Professor Solum discusses how
"nearly all user functions are implemented at the upper application
layer."' 5 ° Solum continues, "Thus, innovation is decentralized and placed in
the hands of individual innovators," and the Internet can become an
"innovation commons."' 5'
The work of Professor Yochai Benkler expands further on the idea of
the Internet as an innovation commons. Professor Benkler describes how
the Internet helps disrupt the traditional producer/consumer model by
empowering the rise of end users who can play both roles as part of a
continuing conversation and exchange of information. The "Great
Shopping Mall" can be transformed into the "Great Agora," featuring
unmediated conversation of the many with the many.'
Benkler addresses the network layers concept in his theory of the
proper role of regulation:
We are making regulatory choices at all layers of the information
environment-the physical infrastructure, logical infrastructure, and
147. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 46.
148. Id. at 45-46.
149. Id. at 42.
150. Id. at 27.
151. Id.
152. Benkler, supra note 43, at 565.
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content layers-that threaten to concentrate the digital environment as
it becomes more central to our social conversation.... At all these
layers, the wrong decisions could enable a reproduction of the mass
media model, with all its shortcomings, in the digitally networked
environment. Avoiding making these mistakes should be the focus of
the efforts we have traditionally focused on structural media
regulation. "
Regulatory choices that "assume a producer/consumer model often
perpetuate this model by regulating in a manner that increases the costs of
becoming a producer of information." '154 Professor Benkler asserts that this
scenario leads inevitably to:
Concentration-because the cost of becoming a professional provider
of the type whose activity is facilitated by the regulation creates an
entry barrier.
Commercialization-because of the high cost providers must adopt a
strategy that relies on sale of their information and cultural products..
Homogenization-because most producers must be commercial, their
reasons to produce are similar, and their need to attract wide audiences
leads to convergence of the content towards the mainstream and the
inoffensive.'
Other commentators have observed the strong correlation between
robust, ends-oriented innovation and the architecture of the Internet. Lee
McKnight notes that innovation is the key factor enabling growth and
change in capitalist economies, 156 and that in turn "the Internet works its
magic through rapid development and diffusion of innovations."'57 The
Internet Protocol acts as a "bearer service"-the general purpose platform
technology linking technologies, software, services, customers, firms, and
markets-so that the Internet is "an innovation engine that enables creation
of a remarkable range of new products and services." '158 McKnight argues
that an open communications infrastructure policy framework is best suited
to foster innovation and growth, although "legal and political forces may
153. Id. at 568.
154. Id. at 575-76.
155. Id. at 576. In a related observation, Philip Weiser points out that "70 percent of the
three billion or so web pages are built by individuals from their desire to share ideas, rather
than to make money." Weiser, supra note 15, at 33 n.147 (quoting Kevin Kelly, The Web
Runs on Love, Not Greed, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2003), at A8).
156. See Lee W. McKnight, Internet Business Models: Creative Destruction As Usual, in
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: BUSINESS SURVIVAL STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL INTERNET
ECONOMY at 39-41 (Lee W. McKnight et al. eds., 2001).
157. Id. at 41 (citation omitted)
158. Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
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intentionally or inadvertently foster innovation-or suppress it.' 59 Michael
Katz believes that "[t]he hourglass architecture allows innovations to take
place at the application and transport layers separately. This ability for
independent innovation speeds the rate of innovation and increases the
ability of entrepreneurs to take advantage of new opportunities."' 6 °
Lawrence Lessig describes how the "end-to-end principle renders the
Internet an innovation commons, where innovators can develop and deploy
new applications or content without the permission of anyone else.'' 6
Others demonstrate how the benefits of the end-to-end design include the
way it facilitates user control and power, innovation, flexibility,
competition, and reliability. In particular, Shah notes, "rather than relying
upon the creativity of a small group of innovators who might work for the
companies that control the network, the end-to-end design enables anyone
with an Internet connection to design and implement a better way to use the
Internet."' 62 Lessig also claims that "[tlo those who argue that control is
necessary if innovation is to occur, and that more control will yield more
innovation, the Internet is the simplest and most direct reply.' 6 3
The very uncertainty stemming from the potential of future
innovation is yet another reason for policymakers to refrain from direct
regulation of the upper layers. Lessig states that "the network is open to
adopting applications not originally foreseen by the designers.'"'" When the
future is uncertain (when future uses of a technology cannot be predicted),
leaving the technology uncontrolled is a better way of facilitating the right
sort of innovation. Plasticity-the ability of a system to evolve easily in a
number of ways-is optimal in a world of uncertainty. 65 Douglas Sicker
also observes that new applications can quickly enter this space and
159. Id. at 42 (citation omitted).
160. Katz, supra note 113, at 26. Weiser also sees the Internet as "a uniquely suitable
platform for innovation." Weiser, supra note 15, at 22. In a later article co-authored with
Joseph Farrell, Weiser observes that modular industry structures like the Internet "enable
independent firms to introduce innovations into an established environment," and can
"facilitate innovation in individual components, spur entry, and result in lower prices."
Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, MODULARITY, VERTICAL INTEGRATION, AND OPEN ACcESS
POLICIES: TOWARDS A CONVERGENCE OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE INTERNET AGE
11 (Competition Policy Ctr., Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, Paper No. CPC02-035, 2003)
(footnote omitted), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC02-035.
"Modularity thus allows for a smooth dissemination of the best of breed in each level or
layer, as users mix-and-match components." Id. (footnote omitted).
161. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 42, at 40 (emphasis in original).
162. Shah et al., supra note 26, at 6.
163. LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 42, at 14.
164. Id. at 37.
165. Id. at 39.
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radically change the landscape. "[I]t is this dynamic nature of the
application space that suggests that the government ... use prudence when
considering policy."' 66
There is also considerable support for linking technological
innovation to evolutionary theories. In August 2003, Wu and Lessig told
the FCC:
In the academic literature, the Commission has endorsed the
evolutionary, or competitive model of innovation. It holds that the
process of technological innovation proceeds most rapidly through a
survival-of-the-fittest competition between new technologies, and it
encourages policies to ensure a fair fight among competing
innovations. If this "Darwinian evolution" is the best path of
innovation, it follows that the most promising path of development will
be difficult to predict in advance. Hence despite the "waste" generated
by a competitive process, the results will be superior to planned
innovation directed by a single prospect holder, however well-
intentioned. That entity will suffer from cognitive biases (such as a
predisposition to continue with current ways of doing business) that
make it unlikely to come to the right decisions, even if it means well.'67
Innovation and the Internet also are closely aligned with proponents
of the school of "creative destruction." McKnight claims that "the seeming
chaos of rapid market rises to prominence of new firms, new technologies,
and new business models is not a passing phenomenon, but rather is a
permanent feature of an Internet economy."' 68 Because of this, he writes,
"the Internet enables creative destruction as usual."'169
Of course, innovations are not limited to the content and applications
layers, or to consumer-facing retail offerings. Innovation also happens deep
in the logical and physical infrastructure of the network. Indeed, layering
166. Sicker, Layered Policy Model, supra note 95, at 10.
167. Letter from Timothy Wu, Assoc. Prof., Univ. of Virginia Law School, and
Lawrence Lessig, Prof., Stanford Law School, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CS
Docket No. 02-52, at 5 (Aug. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Wu & Lessig Letter]; see also Timothy
Wu, Network Neutrality & Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH.
L. 5 (2003). Adherents to this evolutionary model view the innovation process as a survival-
of-the-fittest competition among developers of new technologies. "They are suspicious of
models of development that might vest control in any initial prospect-holder, private or
public, who is expected to direct the optimal path of innovation, minimizing the excesses of
innovative competition." Id. at 4-5. The most promising path of development is difficult to
predict in advance. Some evolutionary theorists view a communications network like the
Internet as a platform for a competition among application developers. "It is therefore
important that the platform be neutral to ensure the competition remains meritocratic." Id. at
5. Backers of an evolutionary approach to innovation take the Internet as evidence of the
superiority of a network designed along evolutionary principles. Id. at 5-6.
168. McKnight, supra note 136, at 40.
169. Id.
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with IP at the center allows for significant network innovation below, as
well as above, the IP layer. And recent history shows that much of that
innovation comes not from established incumbents guarding legacy market
positions, but from hungry, eager competitors. For example, it is well
established that data CLECs such as Covad, Rhythms, and Northpoint were
the early adopters of Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") technology as a
broadband platform. In contrast, the ILECs were not early adopters of this
technology because the incumbents feared cannibalization of their
profitable T-1 services.17 So, the purpose of competition at the lower layers
is not merely to hold in check market power that could damage innovation
at the upper layers. In itself, competition within the logical and physical
layers provides a valuable spur to infrastructure innovation and investment
by all parties, which in turn provides significant benefits to the upper
layers, and also reduces the need for regulation overall as the market
becomes more competitive.
E. Defining and Guarding Against Market Power Abuse in the
Layers
According to Craig McTaggart, "one of the most difficult questions of
telecommunications and information technology law in the 21 st century [is]
whether competition law is capable of protecting the public interest in the
Internet environment." '' In a world where policymakers would begin to
look to the horizontal network layers model to guide the development of
public policy, a well-developed theory of market power abuse, coupled
with strong and effective enforcement tools, is a must. While this Article is
not intended to provide a comprehensive and nuanced economic analysis
suitable for a robust layers framework, a few general points are raised
below.
In the United States, the antitrust laws broadly define the scope of
unacceptable market power, and abuses of such power. In turn, the case-by-
case determinations of market power, and any possible remedies for abuse
of that power, are left to the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") (an arm of
the Executive Branch) and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") (an
independent regulatory agency). The joint DOJ/FTC "Horizontal Merger
Guidelines" establish the methodological tools that the two agencies will
170. See, e.g., Todd Spangler, Initiatives Underscore DSL Future, INTERNET WORLD,
Mar. 16, 1998 (Analysts suggest that "telcos are reluctant to bring to market DSL service on
the order of 1 to 1.5 Mbps... because doing so would cannibalize the lucrative business of
selling dedicated circuits, such as T-I lines, for access."), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cfdls/mODXS/n 10_v4/21049642/pl /article.jhtml.
171. McTaggart, supra note 69, at 21.
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employ in reviewing mergers between companies in the same or related
industries.'72  Relevant product markets are defined, and market
concentration measured with the assistance of the Herfindal-Hirschman
Index ("HHI"), which assesses the market shares of each entity. The HHI
measures relative concentration within a market, anywhere from
approaching zero (numerous small competitors) up to 10,000 (completely
monopolized). HHI factors above 1,800 indicate potentially significant
competitive concerns. 173 On the other hand, where the FCC is involved in
reviewing a proposed merger between regulated entities, the touchstone is
whether the transaction would be in the "public interest."'' 74
In 2002, the European Union took a major step towards combining
competition law and a regulatory framework guided by the horizontal
layers principle. 75 As Rob Frieden explains it:
The European Commission has considered whether a horizontal
regulatory and policy orientation would provide a better outcome....
It attempts to use a harmonized regulatory approach that makes a
functional assessment of what a company currently provides and
whether it possesses market power, rather than who provides a service
in that provider's "legacy" regulatory status. The EU attempted to use
a harmonized regulatory approach that makes a functional assessment
of what a company currently provides and whether it possesses market
power.'76
The market power assessment revolves around the concept of
Significant Market Power ("SMP"), as developed by the European
Commission. 177
172. See generally, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992, as revised
in 1997); see also Marcus, supra note 93, at 7-9 (providing a brief overview of U.S. antitrust
law, agencies, and methodologies).
173. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 § 1.5 (Concentration and
Market Shares).
174. Pursuant to Sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the Communications Act, the
Commission must determine whether proposed transfers of control of licenses and
authorizations will serve the public interest. 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 3 10(d) (2000). The FCC's
public interest standard includes an evaluation of the effect of the proposed transaction on
competition, consistency with specific provisions of the Act, other applicable statutes, and
the Commission's rules and policies, and in some cases, a consideration of the impact on
program and viewpoint diversity. See, e.g., Application of EchoStar Comm. Corp., Hearing
Designation Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 20559, paras. 24-27 (2002).
175. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 Mar.
2002 on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and
Services (Framework Directive), 2002 O.J. (L. 108) 33.
176. Frieden, supra note 74, at 213.
177. Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant
Market Power Under the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, 2002 O.J. (C 165) 6.
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The European Union's new regulatory framework presents an
interesting case of an explicit endorsement and adoption of the horizontal
way of thinking about regulatory policies and market power. Rather than
apply regulation based on specific service definitions, the EU's framework
establishes a neutral process for determining whether to apply regulation
and when to remove it. As Frieden describes it:
The EU approach separates content from conduit and subjects either
horizontal layer to regulation only where market distortions have
occurred, or potentially may occur in view of the market power
exercised by one or more stakeholders. The primary regulatory
oversight model derives from general antitrust/competition policy
rather than from an industry- or service-specific predicate. Regulation
occurs if and only if competition does not exist in a particular
geographic or specific market, and existing regulatory obligations may
be withdrawn on the basis of market analysis. 78
In the United States, the economic literature on layering rightly
focuses on the appropriate exercise of the government's authority to curb
anticompetitive activity at different levels, known as the "de-lamination"
process. Michael Katz has explained that the "de-lamination" of transport
and applications layers "should be taken into account in assessing market
power and determining the appropriate treatment of firms under merger
policy, price regulation, and interconnection obligations."' 79 As de-
lamination continues, the assessment of market power should largely take
place at each layer separately.' 0
Douglas Sicker states that there are sound reasons to treat providers
with market dominance at a given layer differently from providers without
such market dominance.
While similar policy will be applied to all service providers, those
determined as having significant market power will have additional
obligations. When a player is determined to have significant market
power, a pricing condition will be invoked. This condition will vary
depending on power exerted; whether the player controls multiple
layers or significantly controls a particular layer.'
Looking in particular at the transport layer, Michael Katz writes that it
is useful to focus on "bottleneck assets" or "network choke points" as
sources of market power, as long as networks remain interconnected.
A bottleneck is created when one or very few providers possess an
asset (for example, transport facilities) that is critical to competitive
178. Frieden, supra note 74, at 248.
179. Katz, supra note 113, at 28.
180. Id. at 37.
181. Sicker, Layered Policy Model, supra note 95, at 8.
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success and cannot readily be obtained by rivals. . . .In the case of
local access networks, economies of density and scale, coupled with
the sunk-cost nature of network investments, have created a system in
which incumbents may have preempted additional entry to serve most
end users, including single-family residences.'82
Additionally, entry is preempted to most end-user services, such as
small businesses and large businesses in less densely populated areas.' 3
Of course, as Phillip Weiser observes, one cannot assume that the
exclusive gatekeeper will only exist at the physical layer.'84 Indeed, a recent
study solicited by the European Commission explains that Next Generation
Networks ("NGNs") likely will contain new "control points" that can
reside in any layer or "plane" of the network hierarchy.8 5 Another report
prepared for the EC focuses on the need to adopt a coherent regulatory
strategy with regard to naming, numbering, and addressing resources
("unique identifiers") occupying "shifting control points" in the logical
layers in a newly-converged environment. 186  Katz also notes that the
analysis of market power at the applications layer is likely to focus on
somewhat different factors, such as "intellectual property rights; first-
mover advantages resulting from large fixed and sunk development costs;
and network effects.' 1 87 Lee McKnight adds that, as entities seek to obtain
market power through establishment of a controlling position in access
markets, a "new information and communication policy architecture" is
necessary.18 In his view, this architecture should be built on four
principles: open architecture, open access, universal access, and flexible
access.8 9 Finally, Michael Weisman cautions that a strong antitrust-type
182. Katz, supra note 113, at 37.
183. Id.
184. Weiser, supra note 15, at 13.
185. Aurelie Dame et al., Devoteam Siticom & Cullen Int'l, Regulatory Implications of
the Introduction of Next Generation Networks and Other New Developments in Electronic
Communications: Executive Summary 1 (2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/
information-society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/studies/documents/reguatory-implications-
execsum.pdf. Where such control points involve anticompetitive dominance over "upper
plane" elements such as network capabilities, elementary services, user access capabilities,
or individual user information, regulators will need to consider fashioning ex ante
regulations and/or applying ex post remedies. See id. at 9-10.
186. Political Intelligence, Policy Implications of Convergence of Naming, Numbering,
and Addressing: An Orientation, Executive Summary, Final Report of the European
Commission, Sept. 2003, at 11-12.
187. Katz, supra note 113, at 37-38.
188. McKnight, supra note 136, at 55.
189. Id.
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enforcement role, while difficult in practice, is necessary in theory across
all layers. 9 '
In short, unregulated market power is counter-innovation. Monopoly
essentially acts as the worst form of "regulation" by inhibiting activities in
otherwise competitive markets. Policymakers must use the network layers
concept to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the deleterious
effects of unconstrained market power, and take action if necessary to
preserve the "innovation commons" of the Internet and other data-centric
networks.
IV. APPLYING THE LAYERS PRINCIPLE:
THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In general, so-called "regulation of the Internet" comes in two
different guises: (1) common carrier-type entry, exit, and service regulation
by federal and state regulatory bodies (primarily the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") and state public utility
commissions ("PUCs")); and (2) legal liability imposed on ISPs by statute
or regulation (primarily the U.S. Congress, FTC, and state legislatures).
Telecommunications regulators in other countries, and international bodies
such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD"), also play roles in Internet-related matters. For
example, the FCC's adoption of rules concerning VoIP could be considered
the first kind of Internet regulation, while the European Commission's
adoption of rules governing spain could constitute the second kind of
Internet regulation. Generally speaking, traditional communications
regulation should focus on the lower (physical and network) layers, while
Internet content-related regulation should focus on higher (applications and
content) layers.
Professor Solum emphasizes employing the layers principle in
situations where policymakers must be dissuaded from imposing legal or
regulatory burdens on the upper layers of the end-to-end Internet (in other
words, e-commerce issues involving potential ISP liability).'91 The key
implications of Solum's approach, which he lays out in admirable detail in
his own paper, will be discussed briefly in Part A. In addition, this Article
190. Weisman, supra note 91, at 30. "Although the Internet may be a layered network,
corporate business plans in the United States often focus on vertical integration." Id. at 25.
"[1]n practice, companies will do almost anything to avoid competition. They will gladly
surrender markets and products lines to avoid the 'ruinous' price competition that strips
monopoly rents out of the revenue stream." Id. at 27.
191. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 53-102.
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builds on Solum's thinking by providing a separate, more extensive
analysis centered on employing the layers principle in the
telecommunications regulatory context. In particular, Part B focuses on
situations where policymakers must be persuaded to impose legal and/or
regulatory obligations on the lower layers of the last-mile facilities leading
to and from the Internet, where necessary, and not on the actual IP services
or applications themselves.
A. The Layers Principle and ISP Liability
Professor Solum categorizes two broad types of violations of the
layers principle: those that occur at the TCP/IP layers, and those that occur
at the more generalized communications system layers.' 92 In both cases, the
impermissible regulating behavior can come either from public actors
(government authorities) or private actors (individual companies) acting on
their own or under color of law. Solum's examples summarized below
employ the specific layers (content, application, transport, IP, link, and
physical) defined in his own horizontal layering model.
1. Regulations that fail to respect the integrity of the TCP/IP layers
Layers violations primarily involve situations where regulation is
directed at a lower protocol layer in order to address problems that
originate at an upper layer, particularly the content layer. Solum provides
several examples, such as (1) the music distribution industry seeking to
target the TCP/IP layers to combat peer-to-peer networking, (2)
policymakers asserting control over Internet content; and (3) blocking or
filtering requirements.'93 Generally speaking, the more narrowly the
regulation focuses on the layer it is attempting to control, the lesser it will
impair other layers, reduce transparency, or cause substantial "innocent
use" problems.
a. Physical Layer Regulation Aimed at Content Layer Problems
This type of regulation, as demonstrated by the following examples,
involves the most extreme, albeit rarest, layer violations.
192. Id. at 53.
193. Id. at 53-55.
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i. Myanmar's "Cut the Wire" Policy
Until January 2002, the government of Myanmar, the country
formerly known as Burma, allowed no general public access to the Internet,
permitting access by only twelve companies. 194 Under the terms of a 1996
"Communications Computer Law," anyone attempting to use the Internet
without prior sanction from the government would face up to fifteen years
in prison. To enforce this law, "[ltelephone lines were tapped, and fax
machines, modems, computers and satellite dishes [had] to be registered
with the government. Any unauthorized use or possession of 'illegal'
devices resulted in significant penalties and imprisonment."'195 Myanmar
officials apparently feared that the Internet would be a source of negative
influence for their citizens.
Today, Internet usage in Myanmar continues to be stifled due to strict
censorship, blocking on certain political Web sites, and a prohibition on
cross-border purchases. 196 Individuals wishing to access the Internet first
must obtain a license from the Ministry of Communications, Posts, and
Telegraph ("MPT")-which has the only Internet server in the country-
and permit the government to monitor content for any "anti-nationalistic"
sentiment. Use of the Internet for political speech is strictly prohibited. 97
ii. U.S. Proposal to Sever Serbian Internet Access
In May 1999, as the result of an Executive Order issued by President
Clinton forbidding the transmission of services to Yugoslavia, the U.S.
government ordered American ISPs to cut all Internet links belonging to
Yugoslav web suppliers. 98 On May 13, in what some have characterized as
194. "The military junta-the State Peace and Development Council-- had been so
effective in closing down Myanmar... that it has been included in the 'top 20 enemies of
the Internet' list released by Reporteurs Sans Frontieres last year." Swaroopa Iyengar,
Myanmar's Tangled Web, WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,39631,00.html (Oct. 30, 2000).
195. Id.
196. Myanmar Internet Use Increasing, But Still Censored, VIGILANT.TV, at
http://vigilant.tv/article/2383 (Oct. 25, 2002).
197. Similar policies exist in Tunisia, where all private ISPs must be routed through a
state agency, which maintains control over all of the protocols and the country's only
international gateway. Human Rights Watch, The Internet in the Mideast and North Africa:
Free Expression and Censorship, Tunisia (June 1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/
advocacy/internet/mena/tunisia.htm. Further, Tunisia holds ISPs legally responsible for the
content of Web sites they host and requires ISPs to furnish lists of subscribers to the
government. The Tunisian government also attempts technical controls of the Internet,
including filtering content and actively posting its own online material. Andrew Stroehlein,
Tunisia Stifles Web Publications, USC ANNENBERG ONLINE J. REV., (Nov. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.ojr.org/ojr/world-reports/1036538983.php.
198. Cutting Off Internet, DIASPORA (May 13, 1999), available at http://www.diaspora-
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"a flagrant violation of commercial contracts with Yugoslav ISPs, as well
as an attack on freedom of the Internet,"'99 the U.S. government ordered the
Loral Orion company to shut down its satellite feeds for Internet customers
in Yugoslavia. "After receiving thousands of protests, Loral Orion
[reportedly] reversed its decision to sever satellite Internet service to
Yugoslavia,"stating that the prohibition of commerce with that country did
not adversely affect Internet services."'
b. IP Layer Regulation Aimed at Content Layer Problems
Content regulation that operates at the IP Layer presents a more
common form of layer-violating regulation than the category discussed in
the previous Part.
i. French Yahoo! Case
In what was widely viewed as a "setback for free expression on the
Internet," a French court ruled in November 2002 that U.S.-based Yahoo!,
Inc. should be held legally liable under a French law prohibiting the
exhibition or sale of objects with racist overtones. 2 ' The court held that
Yahoo! unlawfully allowed French citizens to access auction sites for
World War II Nazi memorabilia.2 2 It is important to note that the Yahoo!
website in question was not Yahoo.fr, which is specifically developed to
cater to France and its citizens, but rather the Yahoo.com site, whose
servers are physically located outside France and whose content is focused
on serving the citizens of the United States. The French court's ruling
subjected Yahoo! to fines in excess of $13,000 per day unless the company
agreed to install a keyword-based blocking system that prevented French
citizens from seeing the offending Yahoo! sites.2 3 The ruling was viewed
by many observers as "impractical to implement on a large scale and highly
imperfect at identifying Internet users by country. It also [was seen as
setting] a dangerous precedent for countries seeking to impose restrictions
on speech outside their borders." 2 4
net.org/food4thought/cutting-off intemet.htm.
199. Letter from BeoNET to Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair, editors of
CounterPunch, US Shuts Down Yugoslav Internet, COUNTERPUNCH (May 12, 1999), at
http://www.counterpunch.org/beograd.html.
200. Antiwar Protests Reverse Satellite Company's Decision to Cut Internet Service to
Yugoslavia, ANTIWAR.COM (May 15, 1999) at http://www.antiwar.comsatellitel.html.
201. French Court Holds Yahoo Accountable for U.S. Auction Content, CDT POLICY
POST, Vol. 6, No. 20, Nov. 21, 2000, at http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp-6.20.shtml.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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In November 2002, a U.S. federal court rejected the French court's
ruling, establishing an important precedent for future attempts at content
regulation across national borders. In reaching its decision, the U.S. court
questioned whether each government would be able to impose restrictions
on every other country relative to their domestic servers.2 5 In February
2003, the French criminal court dismissed criminal charges against
Yahoo !.206
ii. Pennsylvania Anti-Child Pornography Law
In September 2002, pursuant to a new statute in Pennsylvania, the
Court of Common Pleas issued an order directing MCI (then WorldCom)
and its ISP subsidiaries to block access by its subscribers in Pennsylvania
to five specified URLs on the Internet. 27 The five URLs in question were
suspected of posting child pornography material in violation of the
Pennsylvania law. MCI had no relationship to the sites listed in the order,
as it neither hosted any of the sites nor had any other legal or physical
control over any of the sites or the content contained in them. In order to
comply with the order, MCI was forced to block access to the IP addresses
associated with two of the sites. As a result, all users of MCI's North
American Internet network, including users located inside and outside of
Pennsylvania, temporarily were unable to access any Web sites or other
content or services that shared the IP addresses of the sites at issue. 208
Generally, it is not technically feasible for an ISP to block access to a site
on the Internet only to subscribers located within a specific state, as
Internet networks do not recognize the geographical boundaries of states.2"
205. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192-1193 (N.D. Cal. 2001). An amicus curiae brief filed by a dozen public interest
groups stated:
If French law can be enforced here, Yahoo! could likewise be required to block
access to information that -sabotages national unity' in China, undermines
"religious harmony and public morals" in Singapore. offends "the social, cultural,
political, media, economic and religious values" of Saudi Arabia, fosters "pro-
Israeli speech" in Syria, facilitates viewing unrated or inappropriately rated Web
sites in Australia, or makes available information "offensive to public morality" in
Italy....
Brief of Amici Curiae CDT et al., at 13, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. 01-17424).
206. Center for Democracy & Technology, French Court Rules in Favor of Yahoo! in
Internet Free Speech Case, at http://www.cdt.org/jurisdiction (Feb. 11, 2003).
207. See Letter from Craig Silliman, Director, Technology and Network Legal,
WorldCom, to John J. Burfete, Jr., Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania 3 (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with the Journal).
208. Id.
209. Id.
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All known efforts to map IP addresses to Content Layer
information-geographical locations or national identifications-are layer-
violating actions, so that mapping is both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive."' 0 Solum observes that one possible solution that would be both
more effective and less damaging to the transparency of the Internet would
be the use of digital certificates with encoded geographic or national
identification at the Application/Services Layers, combined with
application proxy servers acting as firewalls.2"
c. Transport Layer Regulation Aimed at Content Layer or
Application Layer Problems
i. The Blocking of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing by ISPs
Some consumer ISPs have been alleged to routinely block particular
ports such as web servers in an apparent attempt to prevent peer-to-peer file
sharing. In 2002, RoadRunner reportedly blocked the use of KaZaA
software and services in certain markets to prevent peer-to-peer sharing of
copyrighted music. In Texas, RoadRunner employed the use of a port
scanner to detect KaZaA activity. Once such activity was detected,
RoadRunner disabled the port, rendering the program, as well as other
"FastTrack" programs such as Grokster and iMesh, completely useless. 212
ii. Panama Blocks VoIP
In an apparent attempt to stem telephone company revenue losses due
to Internet telephony, the government of Panama decreed in November
2002 that twenty-four User Datagram Protocol ("UDP") server ports be
blocked by all Internet service providers.2"3 The ports included those that
were commonly used for VoIP services, as well as other purposes,
presumably with the idea that these too could be used to circumvent the
210. Solum and Chung, supra note 1, at 89-90 (noting MCI's objections to the
Pennsylvania blocking order in juxtaposition to layers analysis generally, and the "fit thesis"
particularly).
211. Id. at 88. But see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, Harvard Law School
Public Law, Research Paper No. 54 (2003) at 21-28, available at http://ssm.coml
abstractid=388860 (discussing, with approval, the Pennsylvania statute as appropriately
compelling "destination ISPs" to assist in control of Internet content).
212. RoadRunner Blocking Use of Kazaa, SLASHDOT, at http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/
02/07/14/0237258.shmtl?tid=153 (July 13, 2002).
213. Panama Begins Blocking IP Ports, LINUX AND MAIN, at
http://www.linuxandmain.com (Nov. 3, 2002).
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national telephone network in making telephone calls at some point in the
future.214
d. IP Layer Regulation Aimed at Transport or Application Layer
Problems
i. Chinese Government Blocking Access to Search Engines
The Chinese government in mid-2002 began blocking access to
Internet search engines Google and AltaVista under a widespread
crackdown on the flow of information over the Internet. The campaign
included putting pressure on foreign companies to comply with state
censorship requirements.2 15 Google and AltaVista refused to sign China's
"Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry," which
commits signatories to investigate and block websites based on their
content."6 Chinese officials apparently fear that search engines such as
Google and AltaVista may permit users to circumvent the country's strict
censorship regime.1 7
In June 2002, state authorities announced plans to close 150,000
unlicensed Internet cafes nationwide, and passed regulations requiring
online publishers to "guarantee the legality" of their content.218 Internet
cafes are also required to install software capable of blocking designated
214. Panama Decrees Block to Kill VoIP Service, SLASHDOT, at http://yro.slashdot.org/
yro/02/04/14/0252201.shmtl?tid=95 (Nov. 3, 2002).
215. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Dr. Eric E.
Schmidt, Chief Executive Officer, Google, and to James Burnett, Chief Executive Officer,
AltaVista Company (Sept. 7 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/09/
china0907.htm.
216. See id. (noting the resistance of Google and AltaVista to Chinese censorship);
Human Rights Watch, Yahoo! Risks Abusing Rights in China, at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2002/08/yahooO8O9O2.htm (Aug. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch China]. The
pledge commits signatories to "[riefrain from producing, posting, or disseminating harmful
information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability, contravene laws
and regulations and spread superstition and obscenity. Signatories must also "monitor the
information publicized by users on websites according to law and remove the harmful
information promptly" and "[r]efrain from establishing links to the web sites that contain
harmful information, so as to ensure that the content of the network information is lawful
and healthy." Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to Terry
Semel, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Yahoo! Inc. (July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/yahoo-itr0773002.htm.
217. Human Rights Watch China, supra note 216. Yahoo! Inc. eventually agreed to sign
the voluntary pledge, prompting outcry among human rights organizations that "Yahoo! will
become an agent of Chinese law enforcement [and] switch from an information gateway to
an information gatekeeper." Id.
218. Id.
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foreign websites.219 Individuals trafficking in content that authorities deem
objectionable have been jailed.
ii. Cable Company Control Over Content and Services as a Way to
Prevent Streaming Video
Certain use restrictions that cable companies have been permitted to
employ, such as limits on broadcast-quality streaming video, may impact
the integrity of the transport or application layer. National consumer groups
allege that cable operators have gained control of about seventy percent of
the broadband market and in the process have succeeded in keeping their
networks closed to competing Internet service providers.22° Although cable
companies have agreed to select a few ISPs to sell Internet services to the
public, they limit not only the number of ISPs, but also the services they
can offer. For example, some cable companies inform the ISPs what
services can and cannot be sold (particularly streaming video and end-user
generated content and applications); control customer relationships and the
ability of non-affiliated ISPs to differentiate themselves; and place
independent ISPs in a "price squeeze" situation.22" ' Dr. Mark Cooper of the
Consumer Federation of America asserts that this denial of access and
discrimination against independent ISPs has resulted in a substantial market
failure: rising prices, poor quality, restriction of choice, and lack of
innovation. He states that "[d]ominated by the cable gatekeepers, whose
primary goal is to prevent competition for its video monopoly, the high-
speed Internet has not seen one significant innovation that exploits its
unique qualities." '222 Whether or not these practices have in fact taken place,
these alleged use restrictions constitute clear examples of potential IP layer
regulation.
iii. VeriSign's "SiteFinder" Service: Competitive Innovation or
Deceptive Practice?
One other recent development demonstrates what some see as another
possible layer-crossing practice-this one operating from inside the
architecture of the Internet itself. VeriSign is the officially-sanctioned
domain name registrar for all ".com" and ".net" addresses. In mid-
219. Id.
220. Statement from Dr. Mark Cooper, Consumer Federation of America, Protecting the
Public Interest Against Monopoly Abuse by Cable Companies: Strategies for Local
Franchising Authorities in the AT&T Comcast License Transfer Process, to the City of San
Francisco, at 2 (May 7, 2002).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2-3.
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September 2003, VeriSign's "SiteFinder" service began directing mistyped
.com and .net e-mail and Web addresses to a different search site. This site
was operated jointly by VeriSign and Overture.com, a California-based
advertising company that branded itself as a search engine. Shortly
thereafter, it was discovered that a so-called "Web bug" was buried in the
SiteFinder page, an invisible image file delivering a cookie that expires
only after five years. 23
Some have argued that VeriSign's new SiteFinder service appears to
be problematic for a number of reasons. One petition filed with ICANN
alleges that VeriSign: (1) broke "technical standards[] by rewriting the
expected error codes to instead point to [VeriSign's] pay-per-click web
directory"; (2) broke "technical standards affecting e-mail services, and
other [I]nternet systems"; (3) "provid[ed VeriSign] with 20 million eyeballs
per day for 'free,' while not paying for the domains they [were] resolving";
(4) "violate[d] trademark rights of domain holders[] by typosquatting on
their .com and .net domains"; and (5) "violate[d] the authoritative nature of
[the Domain Name System], turning it instead into a 'best guess' system
filled with uncertainty.2,24 The petition claims that the Domain Name
System ("DNS"), part of the very architecture of the Internet, should not be
tainted with advertising and privacy concerns, and that in this particular
instance VeriSign should not be allowed to take advantage of its unique
role as the domain name registrar for .com and .net addresses.225
Expressing concern that VeriSign's service was undermining the
security and stability of the Internet, the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN") requested that VeriSign suspend its new
system until security and stability concerns could be properly considered. 26
After VeriSign indicated it would not honor that request,27 ICANN sent a
"formal demand" to VeriSign in early October 2003 asking that it "return
the operation of the .com and .net domains to their state before the 15
September changes, pending further technical, operational and legal
223. Deborah Radcliff, VeriSign's 'SiteFinder' Finds Privacy Hullabaloo,
SecurityFocus, at http://www.securityfocus.com/news/7009 (Sept. 19, 2003).
224. George Kirikos, Stop VeriSign DNS Abuse, Petition to ICANN, at
whois.sc/verisign-dns/.
225. Id.
226. Advisory, ICANN, Advisory Concerning VeriSign's Deployment of DNS Wildcard
Service (Sept. 19, 2003), available at http://www.icann.org/announcements/advisory-
19sep03.htm.
227. Matt Hicks, VeriSign Rebuffs ICANN on Redirects, EWEEK (Sept. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,4149,1276359,00.asp.
[Vol. 56
THE NETWORK LA YERS MODEL
evaluation." '28 VeriSign then agreed voluntarily to temporarily suspend its
web navigation service, 29 but has since filed a federal lawsuit against
ICANN.23° Whether one perceives the SiteFinder service as an innovative
consumer offering, or a threat to the integrity of the domain name system,
there is little doubt that it presents a unique layers-affecting practice
warranting careful scrutiny.
2. Regulations that Fail to Respect the Communications System
Layers
From the foregoing types of examples, Professor Solum concludes
that there should be a strong presumption against layer-violating
regulations. This is especially true where such a regulation: (1) affects or
has the potential to affect a large number of users (such as the nation's
largest ISPs or backbone operators, an entire nation or nations, or most
available TCP ports); or (2) is directed at a lower networking level, such as
the TCP layer, the IP layer, or the Physical Layer, due to perceived
problems at an upper end level, such as the Content Layer or the
Application Layer. 3
Professor Solum also addresses briefly the communication systems
layers as defined by Professor Benkler. Solum observes that these layers
are structured similarly to the Internet network layers but represent
different design principles.232 Nonetheless, the notion of avoiding layer-
crossing regulations remains sound in this context as well.
Solum explains that regulation may be targeted at a code layer in
order to counter problems at the Content Layer. As one example, he points
to the anti-circumvention provision of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), which prohibits the manufacturing or distribution of any
technology, product, service, or device that circumvents copy protection
228. Letter from Paul Twomey, President and CEO, ICANN, to Russell Lewis,
Executive Vice President and General Manager, VeriSign Naming and Directory Services
(Oct. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icann.org/corresepondence/twomey-to-lewis-
03octO3.htm. For further details and a discussion of the contractual and legal issues
associated with this issue, see ICANN Throws Down the Gauntlet to VeriSign on SiteFinder,
ICANN WATCH, available at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.pl?sid=03/10/03/1350217
(Oct. 3, 2003).
229. Press Release, VeriSign, VeriSign SiteFinder Service Update (Oct. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.verisign.com/corporate/news/2003/pr_20031003.html.
230. VeriSign claims that ICANN breached its contractual authority and improperly
attempted to regulate VeriSign's business. Press Release, "VeriSign Files Lawsuit Against
ICANN" (Feb. 26, 2004), available at http;//www.verisign.com/corporate/news/2004/
pr_20040226.html.
231. Solum &Chung, supra note 1, at 101-102
232. Id. at 102.
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technology. 3 This particular provision targets the code that is not part of a
network system (the networking layers) due to concerns about issues at the
Content Layer (copyright infringement).2"' While such layer-crossing
regulations in the communications system layers are structurally similar to
layer-violating regulations in the Internet layers (i.e., targeting a lower
layer to address an upper layer problem), the communications system
layers do not share the general transparency requirement or expectation
across the layers.
B. The Layers Principle and Traditional Common Carrier
Regulation
This Part, which constitutes the remaining portion of the Article,
expands on the layers principles suggested by Professor Solum. The Article
proposes adopting two additional corollaries, and then applying those
corollaries to a variety of real-life public policy issues involving the
regulation of telecommunications and Internet markets. These applications
should be considered preliminary in nature, and can be revised or
supplemented as part of further development and refinement of a viable
horizontal layering framework.
Further, as suggested earlier,235 the layers principle should not be seen
as some sort of absolutist weapon wielded by "layers police." At its core,
the layers approach entails a flexible conceptual framework that provides
important insights and possible action plans. The Author's intention is not
to fashion a rigid horizontally-inclined version of the current vertical legal
"silos" that already increasingly bedevil Internet and communications
markets today. The layers framework also does not necessarily dictate any
particular public policy outcomes, but instead should instill a general
appreciation for the utility of avoiding unnecessary government
intervention and regulation, especially when focused on the wrong network
layers. Nor is vertical integration within and among industry players a
practice to be condemned under the framework, but rather a material fact to
be acknowledged and weighed against legitimate concerns about the
adverse impact of significant market concentration.
As Solum notes, the severity of the layers violation is greater when
the regulation is attempted at a lower or deeper layer in the layer hierarchy
in order to address problems at an upper or higher layer. 36 One can also
take the related position, as will be shown, that the severity of the layers
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See Part III.A. 1.
236. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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violation is greater when nonregulation by a public actor (the government)
allows a private actor's behavior at a lower or deeper layer of the network
to disrupt transparency and harms innovation and innocent use at an upper
or higher layer. This behavior would harm competition by reinforcing
abuse of market power or monopoly control over lower layer facilities.
1. Lower Layer Control
The addition of two corollaries to Professor Solum's list, aimed
specifically at traditional communications regulators, appears to flow
naturally from his first two corollaries. The third corollary concerns the
logical and economic link between an entity's control over unique elements
of the Physical Layer and its resulting control over higher layers in the
protocol stack. The fourth corollary (described in more detail later) builds
on that point to recommend carefully targeted regulatory attention to those
specific horizontal layers where providers are found to be abusing market
power, while leaving the remaining horizontal layers free from unnecessary
regulatory constraints.
Corollary Three: The Principle of Leveraging Lower Layer Control
The ability of a private actor to employ market power at the lower
Physical Layer allows that same entity to leverage market power into the
higher layers that depend on the Physical Layer. In essence, he who
controls the lower layers also can control the dependent upper layers.
This reality of leveraged market power from the lower to upper layers
("monopoly leveraging" in antitrust terms) raises the stakes considerably in
the current telecommunications regulatory battles over local competition,
last-mile regulation, and broadband regulation. In the IP world, the
preponderance of innovative applications, services, and content depends on
the ability of producers and end users at the "edge" (upper layers) of the
network to freely access the lower layers at the network core, including the
Physical Layer. If, for example, a Physical Access provider is able to exert
disproportionate market power over a last-mile conduit-based on
traditional monopoly-derived advantages-that market power then can be
leveraged unfairly into the Applications Layer. This outcome can have a
detrimental impact on the levels of competition, innovation, and consumer
choices otherwise prevalent at that level. Further, given the expanding
scope of applications and services that are provided on the Applications
Layer, the degree of market power control over the Physical Layer is
proportional to the degree of damage that can be caused as a result of
inequitable market power control over the higher layers. In short,
understanding the basis for employing horizontal regulation is all the more
critical in an era of widespread vertical integration, especially where that
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integration involves control over essential Physical Access Layer facilities
and infrastructure.
While the proposed Network Layers Model framework readily
acknowledges the importance of significant market power in formulating
and applying government regulation to specific network layers, the
framework itself does not mandate any particular test of market power, or
dictate how such a test should be applied. Nor is any resulting remedy
specified by the layers approach. Indeed, claims about the existence of
market power depend largely on the type of test employed, and the
empirical evidence presented. One can disagree vehemently about whether
or not market power exists in any particular network layer, and what, if
any, remedy should apply-that is an economic and factual debate well
worth having. However, that dispute should not color judgments about the
ultimate utility and viability of utilizing a layers-informed conceptual
framework.
Finally, it should be noted that this proposed corollary to the general
layers principle does not apply only to the IP-based world of data packets.
Given the reality of layered telecommunications networks, with ready
technical distinctions between services provided and underlying facilities
utilized, many of the concepts and principles associated with layering can
be invoked in the analog and circuit-switched world as well. For example,
even the traditional voice network employs layered protocols. 37 Data
networks also utilize layering models based on different protocols,
including Frame Relay, ATM, MPLS, and Ethernet networks.238
a. Last-Mile Regulation and Competition Policy
Under the proposed third corollary, the need for regulation rests
largely on the need to deter and limit the adverse effects of market power,
which in turn has resided largely in certain last-mile physical infrastructure
and connections with other networks. In the United States, such market
power tends to be concentrated in two discrete areas: local communications
transport facilities (ILECs and cable companies) and certain exclusive use
of radio spectrum frequencies (wireless service providers, and broadcast
radio and television networks and station operators). Utilization of the
237. See, e.g., Sicker and Mindel, supra note 92, at 77 n.32; McTaggart, supra note 69,
at 5.
238. See, e.g., Defense Information Systems Agency, The Commercial
Telecommunications Standards: Standards and Specifications for ATM
http://comm.disa.mil/atm/atmpr.html (last updated Aug. 25, 2003) (showing layers of
ATM protocol); Presentation: Steve Wood et al., RPR Physical Layer, at
http://www.ieee802.org/17/documents/presentations/jan2OO2/hp-phy-O2.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2004) (showing layers of Ethernet protocol).
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horizontal layers framework allows policymakers to focus on retaining
wholesale access regulation at the Physical Access Layer, at least where
historic scarcity of public resources (radio and television spectrum) or
monopoly-derived advantages (local telephony and cable plant) still remain
in place.
Of course, the current market structure, while long persisting, is but a
snapshot in time. Critical market and technology changes, such as the
increased availability of robust intramodal and intermodal platform
alternatives, and the prevalent use of spread-spectrum modulation
techniques, eventually can help remove these non-market-based
advantages. Thus, by focusing on the pertinent network layers, and
recognizing the primary basis for regulation-alleviating market
concentration in certain network facilities and resources-policymakers
can devise the appropriate pro-competitive framework that in turn can lead
to reducing or even eliminating the need for any such regulation in the
future.
b. Local Competition and Unbundled Network Elements
The validity of the layers principle, and the proposed third corollary
above, only highlights the need to create as much competition as possible at
the last-mile network level. Indeed, given the enormous stakes involved at
the higher Applications and Content Layers, U.S. regulators have a duty to
engender competition both between different physical platforms
(intermodal) and within those particular platforms that display market
power (intramodal). Section 251(c) of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which requires the ILECs to provide unbundled network elements
("UNEs"), can be an important legal mechanism in service of the layers
principle.239 In particular, UNEs can help foster intramodal competition for
voice service within the entrenched local exchange network, both in terms
of near-term UNE platform ("UNE-P") competition and longer-term,
facilities-based competition.
As mentioned previously, the concept of a UNE is an interesting
blend of horizontal and vertical thinking. Horizontal framing can help
unlock some of the public policy confusion surrounding the appropriate use
of UNEs to foster local competition. For example, application of a
horizontal layers framework helps raise significant doubts about several
factual conclusions adopted by the FCC in its recent UNE Triennial Review
Order.24 There the FCC, among other things, created a regulatory
239. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
240. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
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distinction between a narrowband, circuit-switched environment (more
precisely, a 64-kilobits per second transmission path established via the
Time Division Multiplexing ("TDM") of interleaved voice signals), and
broadband "packet-switching capability," for purposes of defining what
UNEs should be provided to CLECs.241 The FCC further devised a
regulatory distinction between mass market fiber-based local loops and
copper-based local loops. 2 42 In both cases, the Commission appears to
believe (without any supporting empirical evidence) that the particular
access medium employed at the various layers is a more salient factor in
determining which UNEs to unbundle, than the market power and other
characteristics of the network provider that employs it.2 43
2. Focused Regulatory Attention
Many people unfamiliar with the role of regulation have an almost
instinctive negative reaction without fully understanding or appreciating its
utility. As Sicker writes, "regulations are applied to promote certain
desirable goals, such as ubiquity of service, efficiency of commerce, public
safety, national security, innovation, and education. The problem is that
regulation is a difficult balancing act, where the goals may stand in
opposition to each other."2"
When cast in terms of the horizontal layers framework, the traditional
telecommunications regulator's chief objective is to prevent the exercise of
market power at lower network layers from impinging upon the otherwise
robustly competitive and innovative upper service layers, and to limit or
eliminate unnecessary regulation of upper layers. In this way, policymakers
can help foster a "deregulatory commons," where innovation can flourish at
all levels of the network. Thus, the fourth proposed corollary calls on
regulators to employ their regulatory tools and attention only where
necessary, and no further.
Corollary Four: The Principle of Focusing Regulatory Attention
Regulators should target necessary legal and regulatory resources
only to those specific horizontal layers where market power resides, or
where regulatory attention otherwise is necessary in the public interest, and
Carriers, Report and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC
Docket No. 01-338 (Aug. 21, 2003) [hereinafter UNE Triennial Review Order].
241. Id. at paras. 213, 293.
242. Id. at paras. 211-213.
243. See generally id. at paras. 234-297.
244. Sicker, Layered Policy Model, supra note 95, at 4.
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leave the remaining horizontal layers free from unnecessary regulatory
constraints.245
This deregulatory corollary is well-supported in the economic
literature. As just one example, Professor Reza Dibadj of the University of
Miami has written about the proper way to exert regulatory authority.246
Professor Dibadj's central thesis is that regulators must move away from
industry definitions based on historical distinctions, and towards a
regulatory framework based on economics, with a goal of maximizing both
efficiency and equity.247 Under this approach, the decisionmaker must: (1)
identify the scarce resource (or "bottleneck" input) in question; (2)
determine whether a market participant is exerting monopoly power over
the input to the detriment of competition or public policy; and (3) regulate
the resource based on empirical economic models. The fundamental idea is
to confine regulation to "bottleneck inputs" (portions of existing networks
that are vestiges of monopoly or prohibitively expensive for new entrants to
build), and let competition flourish for the services and applications that
utilize those networks.248 Simple economics dictates that competitive
entities be allowed to access these inputs. As Dibadj succinctly puts it,
"without access to these bottlenecks, competition is a farce. '"249
In a similar vein, James Lawrence proposes that federal policymakers
consider developing a new, more forward-looking regulatory philosophy
focused on regulating access to telecommunications networks, rather than
telecommunications services themselves.25 ° In order to promote the
evolution of a national, next-generation broadband communications
infrastructure in a healthy competitive market, Lawrence suggests drawing
a new regulatory boundary that focuses on the classic monopoly
dilemma-network access-separate from the service business."' He
245. As Kevin Werbach recently told Congress, "Competitive issues of market power
and interconnection primarily concern the physical layer. If the physical layer is open, there
is little or no need to regulate what runs on top." Written Testimony of Kevin Werbach,
Founder, Supernova Group LLC, before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Voice over Internet Protocol Hearing, Feb. 24, 2004, at 3.
247. See Reza Dibadj, Toward Meaningful Cable Competition: Getting Beyond the
Monopoly Morass, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 291-301 (2002) (suggesting that
policymakers should define the technology, isolate the associated scarce resource, identify
any actor with monopoly control, and regulate if necessary in a manner consistent with the
public interest).
247. Id. See Reza Dibadj, Deregulation: A Tragedy in Three Acts, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 13, 2003, at A21.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. James Lawrence, Stratecast Partners, "Regulatory Reform Should Focus on
Access," SPIE 2004 #15, Apr. 9, 2004, at 1.
251. Id. at 5-6.
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points specifically to the commercial use by wireless and wireline networks
of common public resources (radio frequencies, rights-of-way, and roads)
as the rationale for regulating all forms of telecommunications access to
better protect and enhance the public good.252
a. The Basic/Enhanced Dichotomy
As explained earlier, over thirty years ago the FCC first set out on a
path that led to devising and adopting a useful formula for separating out
the basic telecommunications services that should remain subject to
common carriage regulation, and those enhanced features and
functionalities that should remain outside such regulation. While the
concept itself remains sound,253 it is obvious from continuing debates over
the proper classification of broadband and VoIP services that the purported
"bright-line" that once separated these two classes of service increasingly is
becoming blurred and subject to confusion.
The horizontal layers framework offers a significantly more refined,
engineering-based update to the FCC's basic/enhanced dichotomy (which
is mirrored in the 1996 Act's telecommunications service/information
service definitions). In general, the FCC should be receptive to finding
better empirical footing in the actual network and code topology employed
in the telecommunications and Internet sectors, rather than continuing to
rely on the relatively rough-hewn concepts employed more or less
unchanged for several decades. In addition, the basic/enhanced distinction
was born within the confines of the telephone network and telephony
regulation, and to date has not been expressly extended to other types of
transmission networks. By incorporating the horizontal layers framework,
the FCC can expand the scope of the concept beyond telephony to all types
of two-way networks, regardless of the particular technologies used
252. Id.
253. See e.g., Cannon, supra note 13, at 196-98.
[T]he FCC implicitly identified that within the different layers are different
markets and different regulatory concerns: [tihe physical network (layers I and
2 of the OSI reference model) is "basic services" provisioned by telephone
carriers regulated under Title II[;] [t]he logical network (layers 3 and 4) is
TCP/IP or Internet access provisioned by ISPs, directly and intentionally
benefiting from the [Computer Inquiry] safeguards[;] [and the] services,
applications, and content provisioned by [many providers], all generally
removed from communication regulation.
This layered approach to the [Computer Inquiries] means clear segregation
between basic and enhanced services. Basic is never enhanced; enhanced is
never basic .... Identifying something as an enhanced service does not alter the
underlying transmission capacity as basic.
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(copper, fiber, coaxial cable, radio signals, power lines) to construct and
operate them.
The ILECs frequently make the argument that they should be freed
from regulation on their data services because these markets are
competitive. Should robust competition prevail in the consumer broadband
access market under any respected antitrust metric, the ILECs would have a
cogent argument. Such is not the case, however, at least at the present time.
Further, Kevin Werbach notes that this analysis misses the importance of
interfaces between layers." 4 Under the layered model, ILEC data services
should be deregulated if and when the FCC can assure itself that the ILECs
will not be able to leverage lower-level control into other layers. This could
happen in one of two ways: if the physical and logical infrastructure layers
in the relevant markets were sufficiently competitive, or if the FCC or
Congress adopt rules that prevent ILECs from closing the interfaces
between layers or otherwise constraining higher-level competition. To
Werbach, "the Computer II structural separation requirements and the
Computer III non-structural safeguards are in effect such rules."25
b. Regulation of Broadband Access Platforms
The layers principle also assists telecommunications policymakers in
assessing the viability of arguments raised with regard to whether and how
to regulate broadband access platforms such as DSL and cable modem
services. For example, several commentators have written about how
proposals to allow the incumbent cable and telephone companies to
establish "closed" broadband networks, thereby denying access to
independent ISPs, are contrary to the "end-to-end" engineering principle.
Kevin Werbach, for example, says that the layers model, more than
refraining existing debates, brings to the surface important issues that tend
to become lost under the existing regulatory model:
Perhaps the most significant of these is the question of interfaces
between layers. A key element of the Internet model is that these
interfaces are open. This allows competitors to circumvent a bottleneck
at one layer by deploying services over another layer, and prevents
companies that have control of lower-level services from prejudicing
or precluding certain services at higher layers. Cable open access can
thus be understood as a debate over whether cable operators can use
their control of the physical layer (cable distribution plant) to restrict
choice and competition at the three higher levels.... [O]pen interfaces
are increasingly critical to an innovative, competitive market." 6
254. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 65-66.
255. Id. at 67.
256. Id. at 65-66.
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Clark and Blumenthal opine that the "open access" debate is not just
about choice in ISPs; rather, if access to alternative ISPs is constrained or
blocked, user access to content would be similarly compromised. There is a
presumed linkage between lack of choice in access to the Internet and a
loss of the open, end-to-end nature of the Internet.257 Bar and Sandvig urge
the adoption of a new policy bargain between "control" and "access," that
allows the non-discriminatory ability to design the architecture of a
communication platform, not only for those who own and control network
infrastructures, but also for end users or third parties.25s Safeguarding this
ability to design promotes at least two policy interests: fairness and
innovation promotion. 9
The layers approach also supports the current definitional scheme
employed by the FCC for DSL-based broadband services. At present, the
FCC views the DSL transmission component as a telecommunications
service, while the Internet access typically bundled with ("riding on top
of") that platform is an unregulated information service.2" However, in its
wireline broadband proceeding the FCC has proposed doing away with this
distinction. Instead, the FCC would treat the entire service as one
unregulated information service, with no underlying DSL transmission
component.261 The upshot of this proposed reclassification is that
independent ISPs no longer would have access to DSL inputs, as mandated
by the nondiscrimination rules first fashioned in the Computer Inquiry
docket.
257. Clark & Blumenthal, supra note 30, at 19. Others agree about the negative
consequences of allowing the cable company to bundle ISP service and access facilities, and
that "[g]iving such power to discriminate to the owner of the actual network infrastructure
may be viewed as inconsistent with the end-to-end philosophy of the Internet." Shah et al.,
supra note 26, at 5 n.9.
258. Bar & Sandvig, supra note 2, at 22.
259 Id.
260. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
F.C.C.R. 24011, paras. 35-36, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1 (1998) (holding that DSL
constitutes telecommunications service when offered to the public directly or on a stand-
alone basis).
261. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter Broadband
Framework NPRM]. SBC has proposed that the FCC recognize a similar conflation of IP
services and applications with the underlying broadband platform, and forbear from
imposing common carrier regulation on any aspect of this layered bundle. See Petition of
SBC Communications, Inc. for Forbearance from the Application of Title II Common
Carrier Regulation to IP Platform Services, WC Docket No. 04-29, available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&iddocument=
6516086662 (filed Feb. 5, 2004).
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A careful understanding of the horizontal layers framework exposes
the technical fallacy of the FCC's proposal. In short, the FCC's broadband
redefinition would violate the layers concept by collapsing the various
layers into a single information service defined by its upper layers, and
allowing the Physical Access Layer (i.e., DSL) to control or discriminate
against those layers. Through an understanding of the layers principle and
its corollaries, the Commission should be led to abandon the mistaken
conflation of upper-level Application Layer services such as Internet access
with lower-level Physical Access Layer services such as broadband access
platforms, and instead retain its original correct classification of DSL-based
transport as a telecommunications service (see Figure 8 below).
Layers Analysis Supports DSL as Telecommunications Service
Internet Internet
Access Over Access Over
Dial-Up DSL
S Apps Apps
Information Service
TCP TCP
Traditional Telecom IP IP
Voice Telecommnatin Voice
Transport Transport Transport
Figure 8
Others have picked up on this fatal flaw in the FCC's tentative
thinking. Vint Cerf cautions that "this [DSL] transmission path should not
in any way be confused with one of the more common applications of DSL:
Internet access." '262 Rob Frieden observes that the unclear legal status of
broadband service evidences "significant confusion in determining the
262. Cerf Letter to Evans/Powell, supra note 16, at 2.
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length and breadth of what constitutes a telecommunications service,
particularly when coupled with either a cable service or an information
service. "263 Frieden sees dubious motivations at work, believing that the
FCC seeks to eliminate the application of longstanding common carrier
regulatory burdens on telephone companies when they bundle or blend
broadband telecommunications services with information services. In order
to carry out its claimed "functional" approach, however, the Commission
"has to subordinate the telecommunications transport function relative to
the information services provided and also to dismiss the previously
recognized legal, marketplace and technological differences between the
two carriers.' 2" Frieden states that:
[I]n its chosen deregulatory quest, the FCC has engaged in a flawed
and disingenuous strategy to combine previously different regulatory
models based on new functional similarity. Suddenly a
telecommunications service can become stripped of its common carrier
regulatory triggers if and when the FCC chooses to emphasize the
content or enhancements carried via the telecommunications
conduit.265
The FCC's proposed policy also could unleash some enormously
anticompetitive consequences. Again, Frieden observes that:
Rather than narrow a regulatory loophole, the FCC has created an
incredibly larger one . . . [that appears] to offer telecommunications
service providers the ability to free themselves of any and all common
carrier burdens that otherwise would apply to broadband
telecommunications service simply by characterizing these offerings as
information services.
Much of this ad hoc rethinking of how definitions apply stems from
the vertical regulatory models the Commission has erected and seeks
to maintain. While new technologies do force regulatory agencies to
determine into which categories innovative new services fit, the
predominant trigger for trouble lies in the Commission's perceived
need to make all or nothing assignments .... 266
263. Frieden, supra note 74, at 229.
264. Id. at 230.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 234, 236; see also id. at 241 ("The Commission cannot achieve the twin goal
of sustaining service classifications and the vertical regulatory regimes while also creating
novel ways to ignore the telecommunication services aspect of a convergent, blended, and
hybrid service that clearly has a horizontal layer of telecommunications delivered to
consumers.... Instead the Commission pulls telecommunications capabilities out from the
telecommunications service classification, thereby achieving deregulation without having to
undertake the fact-finding and record-generating to support specific . . . deregulation.");
Katz, supra note 113, at 35-36 ("Manifestly, a [broadband] policy that did not break out the
telecommunications component [from the vertically bundled package of information
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Sicker also notes the hazy thought process behind the FCC's stated
desire to create broadband deployment incentives for the incumbent DSL
facilities providers. In particular:
Some believe that the only way to create an incentive for broadband
deployment is vertical integration. We view this as an invitation for
abuse. While we believe that physical network providers need a return
on investment, we do not believe that this should come at the expense
of eliminating competition in higher layer[s] to create that incentive.
There is no just reason to destroy the competitive application market
that has developed in the name of broadband deployment. 67
Vint Cerf has expressed puzzlement at the idea that the ILECs require
additional incentives to deploy DSL-based broadband facilities. In addition
to the fact that such facilities largely are available now, he writes,
"competition is its own incentive." '268 In the supposed battle between the
ILECs and cable companies, "no company can afford to sit on the sidelines
ands watch its competitors take the market. To the extent the ILECs believe
they can do so, of course, it is yet another sign that they have market power
in providing broadband services."269
Werbach also demonstrates the flawed premise behind the call by
some for "regulatory parity," which amounts to adopting the same legal
classification and treatment for DSL-based broadband and for cable
modem-based broadband platforms:
The layered model makes many of the conflicts that today bedevil
regulators more tractable. For example, the inconsistency between the
treatment of DSL, which is subject to federal open interconnection
requirements (under Title II), and cable modem services, which
currently are not, turns out to be a figment of the [vertical] model. Both
cases involve the possibility that service providers with control over
the physical and logical layers of networks will extend that control into
applications and content. Looking at the issue in this way doesn't
compel one outcome or the other. It may be that the FCC concludes
open access is the right policy result, but that in the cable situation
market forces will be sufficient to arrive at that result. The important
shift is that the focus is now on the key policy issue at stake, rather
than the almost accidental context that defines the issue today.7 0
Moreover, contrary to ILEC claims, the advent of DSL technology
constitutes only an evolution of the Physical Access Layer, not a top-to-
bottom vertical revolution. DSL utilizes existing physical links already
services] would fail to recognize de-lamination and would be subject to gaming and raising
the possibility of competitive distortions.").
267. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 14.
268. Cerf Letter to Evans/Powell, supra note 16, at 3.
269. Id.
270. Werbach, A Layered Model, supra note 2, at 64-65.
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connected to most homes: the twisted-pair copper telephone lines.
Undoubtedly the higher modem speeds, "always on" feature, and ability to
simultaneously use the telephone and the Internet are superior aspects of
DSL vis-A-vis ISDN or traditional narrowband dial-up service.
Nonetheless, in every other way the DSL service provided to consumers
(the bundled retail marriage of Internet access and DSL platform)
represents merely a network upgrade from the point of view of the Physical
Layer. From the Internet's perspective, "broadband" and "narrowband"
(however defined) essentially are one and the same. As Vint Cerf puts it,
"DSL technology is merely the latest in a continuing stream of incremental
improvements to the use of the existing telephone network."2'
In addition, the horizontal layers framework shows the deep nature of
ISPs' dependency on DSL, at least for the present time. Cerf and others
have shown that there are no viable near-term alternatives to the two
dominant broadband access platforms of cable modem service and DSL
service."2 At the same time, the very existence and flourishing of the
Applications Layer obviously relies on the lower Physical Access Layer-
there is no such thing as a stand-alone application without the means of
conveying that application between different points in a network. As a
result, the failure to appropriately regulate last-mile broadband facilities
will allow those providers to extend their market power into the higher
layers, including applications and content. This particular form of vertical
integration could cause undue harm to the Internet.
At the same time, the layers principle also offers a well-founded basis
for disproving the BOCs' claim that Internet access and DSL constitute one
unified entity that would be difficult and costly to untangle, somehow
resulting in a loss of innovation. Certainly Qwest's recent announcement of
a "Naked DSL" offering-unbundling the voice service and the Internet
access component from the DSL transmission platform-demonstrates that
at least one BOC has little difficulty in disaggregating these piece-parts of
the retail high-speed service.273 This is hardly surprising, as the broadband
271. Cerf Letter to Evans/Powell, supra note 16, at 2.
272. See id. at 3 ("Physics gets in the way of the supposed competition" in providing
broadband transmission services. As a result, "[a]t best, the residential market is a
duopoly-and in the worst case, consumers have only one choice or, in poorly served areas,
no choice at all."); Vinton G. Cerf, Broadband Policy and Delivery Options, International
Engineering Consortium, at 3 (brochure containing Cerf's June 3, 2002 keynote address at
SUPERCOMM 2002) [hereinafter Cerf IEC Paper]. Different broadband platforms "are
indeed technologically competitive," but "whether they effectively compete is another
story." Id.
273. Alex Salkever, Will Naked DSL Chill the Cable Guys?. BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, at
www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2004/tc20040227_8296-tc047.htm (Feb.
27, 2004).
[Vol. 56
THE NETWORK LA YERS MODEL
networks naturally have been constructed around these very separate, and
severable, layers. Additionally, as ISPs have argued repeatedly in the
FCC's wireline broadband proceeding, innovation at the "edge" of the
network is the hallmark of the Internet, and the FCC's proposed
redefinition of DSL would wreak havoc on that innovation.274 Professor
Benkler points out that "[c]ompeting ISPs can compete [with cable modem
operators] precisely by offering users different types of capacities over the
same system. These ISPs are the primary potential separating agent
between the ownership of the carriage medium and control of the
content." ' Without that separation, the underlying provider can seize
control over the upper layers as well, to the detriment of innovation and
other consumer welfare benefits. Indeed, Professor Solum remarks that
"[t]he nature of ISP service is not inherently fixed, and they can and do
provide [a] wide range of diverse services including audio and video
content. In short, the independent ISPs are engines for innovation in
markets we do not yet imagine. 276
Professor Solum also discusses the danger of vertical integration in
the cable modem services context, where
the same company sells products at the Content [Llayer as a media
company, owns the cable wires at the Physical [L]ayer as a cable
company, and has the ability to impose controls at the code layers as
an ISP. Such vertical integration of functions across the layers may
raise anti-competit[ion] and [antitrust] concerns, especially when
considering the cable companies' . . . monopolies in the high-speed
Internet access market-perhaps the most important segment of the
market because that is where the future lies.277
The same lesson applies to the ILECs' DSL offerings. For example, it
is not in the ILECs' interest to allow end users to utilize VoIP services and
applications, which would tend to cannibalize the ILECs' long-distance and
exchange-access services. In these instances, and others, innovation clashes
with legacy revenue streams, and the latter wins out if the underlying
platform provider is allowed to control what the customer can and cannot
do.2
78
274. See generally, THE BROADNET ALLIANCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF A BROAD NET: THE
SIGNIFICANT ROLE OF ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND SUCCESS OF
THE INFORMATION AGE (2002), available at http://www.broadnetalliance.org/whatwere_
doingjfcc.html.
275. Benkler, supra note 43, at 575.
276. Solum and Chung, supra note 1, at 95.
277. Id.
278. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994) (finding that the
First Amendment authorizes the U.S. Government to take steps "to ensure that private
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In this particular situation, policymakers generally have two choices:
restrict (quarantine) the upstream dominant firm, or regulate that firm to
some degree (which requires regulation of wholesale prices and quality of
access). While a restriction on vertical integration would more directly
address the market dominance concerns, appropriate regulation designed to
facilitate nondiscriminatory access at various layers appears sufficient in
most cases to largely negate those concerns. Many forms of vertical
integration can bring efficiency benefits to the marketplace, and a relatively
small likelihood of harming competition. Thus, quarantine of the dominant
firm should be viewed only as a measure of last resort, and other regulatory
options should be considered where necessary to protect competition and
innovation in adjoining network layers.
For example, Farrell and Weiser explain that even a vertically-
integrated monopolist may have natural incentives to voluntarily "provide
access to its [dominant] platform when it is efficient to do so, and to deny
such access only when access is inefficient." '79 At the same time, however,
Farrell and Weiser identify no fewer than eight separate exceptions to this
economic concept of internalizing complementary externalities ("ICE");
many of these exceptions provide compelling reasons for why a broadband
platform provider with market power might inefficiently close its platform
to entities in the applications market.28 In a similar fashion, layers analysis
helps reveal those instances where powerful firms at one level in the
communications network should not be allowed to leverage that power
unfairly into adjacent levels, causing significant damage to competition and
innovation. Thus, at least in the current market environment, the
provisioning of broadband access platforms by the ILECs and cable
companies merits careful regulatory scrutiny. At minimum, the FCC should
retain (in the case of DSL) and consider imposing (in the case of cable
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communications, the
free flow of information and ideas.").
279. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 160, at 4.
280. Id. at 17-37. These failures in ICE as a central organizing principle include: (1)
"Baxter's Law" (monopoly platform is subject to competition but applications market is
not); (2) price discrimination in a bundled services environment; (3) potential competition in
complementary markets; (4) bargaining problems between gatekeeper platform monopolies
and independent innovators; (5) incompetent incumbents failing to understand ICE; (6)
"option value" (fear of inability to close platform at later date); (7) regulatory strategy
considerations (creating unfavorable precedent for related markets); and (8) incomplete
complementarity (leading to attempted monopolization of the applications market). Id. at
21-37. Farrell and Weiser see at least three coherent paths for regulators to consider,
including a categorical protection of modularity, in response to the possible need to regulate
vertical relations. Id. at 37-45.
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modem service) a wholesale access requirement in the face of evidence of
demonstrable and persistent market power. 81
Finally, Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig also see a fruitful connection
to innovation theory:
There is a direct link between these evolutionary theories of innovation
and the market for broadband Internet applications. The Internet has
long functioned as a figurative 'platform' for a fierce and highly
innovative competition between applications.... This evolutionary
process was directly facilitated by the early Internet's [end-to-end]
design.... The architecture thus removed the possibility that network
owners, for competitive or strategic reasons, would interfere with new
applications. 22
In sum, it is important to allow effective "vertical competition" in the
broadband space, primarily through engendering robust intermodal and
intramodal competition at the Physical Access Layer. The Internet market
generally has been characterized by massive shifts in the competitive
center, with competition coming from other layers (i.e., hardware
companies versus operating system companies versus browser companies
versus open source platform companies). Vint Cerf sees no logical reason
to adopt the FCC's recommended view that "open nondiscriminatory
telecommunications platforms no longer serve the public interest when they
are used to provide so-called broadband services." '283 As Professor Solum
notes, the "vertical integration of content, ISP, and access market threatens
to stifle the innovative future of the Internet by eliminating this strategic
competitive factor in the critically important residential broadband
market."" Where emerging technologies or competitive entry fail to create
the proper conditions to eliminate market concentration in the consumer
broadband space, policymakers must not hesitate to employ appropriate
281. FCC Chairman Powell recently acknowledged the significant potential harms from
restrictions imposed by vertically-integrated broadband platform providers on their end
users, but he remains unconvinced that the concerns are anything but speculative at this
point. Remarks of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium
on "The Digital Broadband Migration," University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder,
Colorado 4 (Feb. 8, 2004). As an alternative to regulatory solutions, he has challenged the
broadband network industry to voluntarily preserve four "Internet Freedoms" for end users:
freedom to access content, freedom to use applications, freedom to attach personal devices,
and freedom to obtain service plan information. Id. at 5-6. Obviously, it remains to be seen
whether the Chairman's preferred reliance on public exhortations, rather than regulatory
mandates, will successfully deter the improper exercise of market power by the predominant
broadband platform providers.
282. Wu & Lessig Letter, supra note 167, at 5-6.
283. Cerf IEC Paper, supra note 272, at 4.
284. Solum & Chung, supra note 1, at 95.
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measures, such as a wholesale access requirement, to protect competition
and innovation at all network layers.
c. IP Communications: VoIP and Other Applications
Providers of so-called VoIP services and other IP-enabled
applications and services, such as Vonage, 8x8, VoicePulse, and Phonom,
have argued against common carrier-style federal and state regulation of
competitive VoIP services. The typical argument under legacy legal
analysis is that VoIP is an information service that by definition cannot be
classified and treated as a telecommunications service.285 This particular
view faces stiff political challenges on several fronts. State regulators
already have begun to insist that providers of VoIP services look just like
ordinary telephone companies, and so the providers must seek state
approval as common carriers to provide such services to the public.286 With
that carrier certification would come other public interest obligations, such
as the payment of federal and state universal service charges, the provision
of 911 emergency services, and submission to wiretapping requirements
under CALEA and related statutes. In a similar vein, the incumbent LECs
have argued that providers of VoIP service must comply with many
existing carrier regulations, particularly with regard to the payment of
intercarrier compensation (interstate carrier access charges) to the ILECs.287
At this juncture it is unclear whether and when this legal issue ultimately
will be resolved at the FCC or elsewhere.288
285. See, e.g., Joint Comments of MCI and CompTel, WC Docket No. 03-211, at 5-13
(Oct. 27, 2003), available at http://www.comptelascent.org/news/recent-news/vonage-
oct27_2003.pdf (arguing that Vonage's VolP service is an interstate information service
under pertinent law and regulations).
286. Complaint of the Minn. Dep't of Commerce Against Vonage Holding Corp.,
Docket No. P-6214/C-03-108, 2003 Minn. PUC LEXIS 94 (Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
Sept. 11, 2003) (concluding that the Commission possesses jurisdiction over Vonage "as a
company providing telephone service in Minnesota," and ordering Vonage to acquire a
carrier certification and comply with 911 service and fee requirements), overruled by
Vonage Holdings Corp. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp 2d 993 (D. Minn. 2003)
(holding that the PUC decision is contrary to federal law and issuing a permanent injunction
against its enforcement).
287. See, e.g., Comments of Verizon, WC Docket No. 03-211 at 13-15 (Oct. 27, 2003)
(advocating that Vonage provides a telecommunications service and must pay interstate
access charges); Comments of SBC Communications, Inc., WC Docket No. 03-211, at 8
(Oct. 27, 2003) (arguing that all IP telephony services are subject to paying terminating
interstate access charges).
288. The FCC has initiated a new rulemaking proceeding to examine the various legal
and regulatory issues surrounding VoIP and other "IP-enabled applications and services."
See IP-Enabled Services NPRM, supra note 99, para. 1. Citing the work of authors such as
Kevin Werbach, Robert Entman, Michael Katz, and Douglas Sicker, the NPRM suggests as
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Moreover, when the FCC first was compelled to take a look at the
regulatory classification of VoIP in 1998, it fell back on familiar territory:
the notion that one should regulate based on what type of retail service one
can discern. 28 9 Employing its so-called "functional approach," the FCC
tentatively divided up the world of "IP telephony" services into at least two
discrete buckets: "phone-to-phone" and "computer-to-computer. 2 90 Based
on four non-dispositive factors, the Commission indicated that certain types
of phone-to-phone service lack the characteristic of an "information
service. ' '291 However, the FCC declined "to make any definitive
pronouncements in the absence of a more complete record ....
As FCC Chairman Powell already recognizes, the federal government
desperately needs a new theory to encompass all forms of IP-based services
and applications. The layers approach offers a compelling way to frame the
issue. In the coming IP world, voice service becomes just another
application-in this case, audio bits-that "ride on top of' the IP protocol.
So, too, data bits and video bits and any other bits would be treated from an
engineering perspective as any other element of the Applications Layer.
There no longer is any necessary tie between the service being offered-
two-way interactive voice service-and the underlying network used to
provide the service-IP transport (see Figure 9 below).2 93 In point of fact,
regulation of the upper layer application simply makes no sense where
there is no longer an automatic correlation to a fixed lower layer platform
technology.
one option that the Commission could adopt a layers-informed regulatory framework. Id.
para 37.
289. See 7'CC Report to Congress, supra note 61, at para. 86 (noting that "the
classification of a service under the 1996 Act depends on the functional nature of the end-
user offering.").
290. Id. at para. 87-88.
291. Id. at para. 89. The four non-dispositive factors are: the provider holds itself out as
providing voice telephony service, the provider does not require the customer to use
different CPE, the provider allows the customer to call ordinary telephone numbers, and the
provider transmits customer information without net change in form or content., Id. at para
88.
292. Id. at 90.
293. See Ray Gifford, President, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, VoIP-
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF REGULATION, available at http://www.pff.org/issues/
communications/testimony/l (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). This presentation provided the basis
for Figure 9, and the general format for Figure 8.
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Figure 9
Moreover, in a market where any and all such applications are offered
on a competitive basis, there simply is no need for common carrier-style
regulation. Employing the new Corollary Four (the principle of focused
regulatory attention) suggested earlier, any lingering concerns about the
need for government oversight of the retail voice services market largely
are negated when those services are shifted to an IP platform. While
tailored regulation of last-mile Physical Access Layer facilities that carry
the VoIP services may continue to be necessary in the presence of
demonstrable market power, such pro-competition regulation need not and
should not extend upward to the Application Layer.
Of course, VolP is not a monolith, and not every mingling of voice
service with IP automatically constitutes an Application Layer
functionality. Douglas Sicker agrees that voice can be an application, and
separate from the network on which it operates, but he acknowledges that
voice services running over packet networks bring up many difficult
issues."' Policymakers initially must consider distinctions between (1)
voice services running over the Internet and those services running over
internet protocols, (2) self-provisioned services and those obtained from a
service provider, (3) whether there is a "holding out of a service," and (4)
whether IP-based services should be viewed as in their infancy, and
therefore should be free from burdensome regulations. Fundamentally,
however, because voice fast is becoming an application, and not
294. See Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 22.
Layers Analysis Supports Non-Telecom Regulation of VoIP
Internet Voice over IP
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coterminous with the network on which it operates, voice as a service
generally "should not be subject to the same regulatory conditions as the
physical network."29
d. Other Key Public Policy Issues
The layered model invites closer scrutiny of other public policy issues
as well. While in some cases the framework may not suggest ready
answers, it does provide policymakers with a unique and helpful vantage
point from which to identify and assess the potential options.
i. Jurisdiction
Determining whether and how a regulatory authority can claim
jurisdiction over one or more layers of an IP-based service offering is an
incredibly thorny issue. McTaggart proclaims that it is not possible to
declare who has jurisdiction over the Internet because "[d]ifferent elements
of the Internet's four layers are subject to widely divergent jurisdictional
patterns, and many issues cross over both jurisdictions [and] layers." '296
Katz predicts that jurisdictional analysis is very likely to become even more
of a mess if policymakers continue to try to determine the "location" of
services in the Applications Layer. In fact, it is far from evident that an
application is usefully viewed as having a location. A major consequence
of this development is that all layers will increasingly be regulated at the
federal level. Under another plausible scenario, one could argue for state or
local regulation of aspects of the Physical Access Layer, based on the
geographic location of the facilities and the effects on local markets.2 97
Nakahata looks at the federal/state/local jurisdiction issue from a
more legalistic perspective:
Congress must make a substantial change in the current division of
labor between the federal government, states, and local governments in
regulating information platforms. This, too, should look at
functionally, recognizing that the federal government is generally not
as good at applying regulatory standards to local situations or
conducting detailed applications of rules to specific facts. On the other
hand, the federal government is good at setting an overall policy
framework and set of objectives, and the FCC is institutionally well-
suited, because it is independent from Congress and psychologically
distant from local or state politics, to play the "bad cop" in forcing
necessary, but politically unpalatable reforms. In particular, this would
entail expanding the FCC's "forbearance" authority to allow it to
295. Id.
296. McTaggart, supra note 69, at 1.
297. Katz, supra note 113, at 36-37.
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preempt unnecessary state and local regulation of information
platforms where those regulations do not rise to the level of barriers of
entry.
298
ii. Interconnection
The layered model is helpful in allowing policymakers to
systematically evaluate interconnection relationships between providers of
different service layers. Sicker finds that interconnection resides at the very
heart of the layered model. In his view, "[p]roviders of access, transport,
and applications may be subject to varying interconnection obligations on
terms defined by their market power. '299 In particular, the problem involves
ensuring that there are appropriate interconnection arrangements between
legacy networks and IP networks.
Nakahata notes that interconnection mandates address "network
effects" as a source of market power, which is different from market power
derived from control of underlying bottleneck facilities (as well as market
power derived from access and interconnection on a vertical plane between
layers). Given Metcalfe's Law (the utility of a network equals the square of
the number of users), Nakahata explains that antitrust authorities have
expressed concerns about market power based on network effects
alone.3°Government intervention typically involves mandating that the
dominant party interconnect its network with others.
Entman observes that ideally, when a provider operates at multiple
layers, public policy should keep interfaces open to interconnection at each
layer. This would mean carriers should provide both horizontal
interconnection (connecting with firms that compete at the same level) and
vertical unbundling (giving competitors access to one layer without
requiring access to other layers). However, it is not at all clear that such a
mandate need apply absent the existence of persistent market
concentration. As Entman states, "the importance of horizontal
interconnection arises particularly at those levels within the [Physical
Layer] at which bottlenecks occur: local access and interoffice
transport."30'
298. Nakahata, supra note 3, at 141.
299. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 20.
300. Nakahata, supra note 3, at 135.
301. Entman, supra note 77, at 16.
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iii. Intercarrier Compensation
The current federal and state regulatory distinctions for different
terminating carrier access rates (IXCs, ILECs, CLECs, wireless carriers,
ISPs) already make little sense on their own terms. When imported into the
IP world, these distinctions become even more nonsensical. The layers
principle offers further compelling support for adoption of a uniform
intercarrier compensation methodology, such as a "bill-and-keep" (no
charges) regime, applicable to all forms of terminating traffic where at least
one party is a regulated carrier. Where both parties are unregulated entities
(such as ISPs), the FCC and the states have no regulatory jurisdiction, and
market-based arrangements should prevail.
Weinberg states that access charge obligations need not turn on the
telecommunications/information services distinction in the long run.
Instead, "it makes sense to move access charges towards costs for
telecommunications and information service providers alike .... Currently,
information service providers do not pay access charges. That exemption
should continue."3 °2 It would not be sensible to extend the current subsidies
in access charges to a new class of users, imposing distortions and
inefficiencies on IP networks.
The notion of interstate rates versus intrastate rates (federal versus
state jurisdiction) also faces a direct challenge from the IP world. The
general concept of jurisdiction over the Internet-which, as discussed
above, is alien to the very nature of IP protocols and the Internet "network
of networks"-remains an area steeped in legal controversy and confusion.
Application of the layers principle serves to emphasize, for example, that
there is no obvious state role in regulating intercarrier compensation rates
for facilities carrying IP-based applications.
iv. Universal Service
Under the auspices of Section 254 of the Telecommunications Act,
the FCC has adopted a federal universal service fund ("FUSF").3 °3 The
contribution mechanism promulgated by the Commission assesses charges
based on a particular carrier's total interstate retail telecommunications
revenues.3" In a market environment of bundled offerings including
services of different regulatory treatment and jurisdiction, however, the
FCC's contribution mechanism is increasingly difficult if not impossible to
302. Weinberg, supra note 2, at 239.
303. 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000).
304. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, para.
40 (1997).
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
apply in a rational manner. The IP world changes the equation even more
radically.
Over the past three years, certain parties have advocated doing away
with the FCC's current revenue-based contribution mechanism in favor of a
flat-rate proposal that relies on a consumer's physical connections to a
public network. Such an approach is more consistent with the bundled
environment and the ways that consumers access and utilize networks.3 °5
The connections-based approach finds further support in the layers
principle, as it meshes nicely with the common sense focus on the Physical
Layer rather than particular applications and services at the upper layers.
John Nakahata agrees that the layered approach helps frame the issue of
how to pay for universal service.0 6 A connections-based approach:
holds the promise of moving universal service contribution into a
layered approach by emphasizing the [P]hysical [Llayer. A connection
need not be a telecommunications service connection, an information
service connection, or a video connection. A connection can be any
connection to an information platform that interconnects with other
information platforms. Thus, while a connection-based approach to
contribution also faces definitional issues, it has the potential to
provide a funding base that is more consistent with the convergence of
the information platform.3"7
Behind the connections-based approach is the concept of associating
universal service payments not with service provision, but instead with the
physical facilities along which the information moves. Weinberg suggests
that a payment obligation tied to the ownership of qualifying facilities
could apply without regard to whether the information moving via those
facilities was in digital or analog form, or was packet- or circuit-switched.
Specifically, "[t]o the extent that the high-cost fund is designed to support
the availability of physical infrastructure throughout the nation, it provides
a nice symmetry to impose the associated costs on physical infrastructure.
More consequentially, the approach would be technology-neutral.""3 8
In Douglas Sicker's model, funding for universal service also would
come from the providers of the physical networks. By separating out the
applications and content from the physical network on which they ride,
important social policies can be aligned with the economic reality of
305. See Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Comments of WorldCom, Inc., CC
Docket No. 96-45, at 18-23, available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?
native-or-pdf=pdf&id document=6513583157 (Feb. 28, 2003).
306. See Nakahata, supra note 3, at 138.
307. Id. at 140. At one time Mr. Nakahata represented CoSUS, a coalition of carriers and
end users advocating that the FCC adopt a connections-based contribution mechanism for
the federal USF regime.
308. Weinberg, supra note 2, at 235.
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servicing under-served areas.309 After all, "[u]niversal service is about
building networks and providing services to the [underserved]. The
distance sensitive aspect of building a network does not apply to the
application space."310 Additionally, the point of applying a layered model to
Universal Service is that it separates the distance sensitive component (the
physical network) from the non-distance sensitive component (the
application or content).31' Under this model, VoIP would not be subject to
Universal Service requirements because the USF subsidy should both apply
to, and be recovered from, telecommunications services like broadband
platforms.
Michael Katz writes that his concept of "de-lamination" also raises
the issue of which layers are covered by Universal Service. While the
definition under Section 254 of the Act appears to apply to the transport
layer, the FCC's policies typically are expressed in terms of the voice
application coupled with the underlying transport network required to offer
voice services using a circuit-based technology. Concerning consumers in
"high-cost areas," Katz believes a sensible policy might subsidize the high
costs associated with the transport layer, while low-income consumers
might receive subsidies for both transport and applications.3"2
v. Consumer Welfare, Safety, and Accessibility Issues
Policymakers express concern about a host of consumer welfare
obligations, including emergency services (such as 911 capability), law
enforcement (such as the CALEA wiretapping requirements), and access
for persons with disabilities. Needless to say, these are all legitimate social
priorities, and should be taken seriously as the nation's communications
and information platforms continue to evolve. Nonetheless, there are ways
of accommodating and even advancing these priorities without doing so
within the stifling confines of the legacy legal construct.
Rather than rely solely on regulation to enforce certain accessibility
requirements, for example, Sicker suggests that "government, industry and
interested parties should work together to inform the [pertinent] service
providers of the [general] needs and do so early [enough] in the
development or deployment process to minimize the difficulties (cost, time
or other) of supporting such needs." '313 In many cases, these "social goods"
can be dealt with in a manner that comports with the layers approach. In
309. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 21.
310. Sicker, Applying for a Layered Policy Model, supra note 95, at 3.
311. Id. at 6.
312. Katz, supra note 113, at 47.
313. Sicker, Further Defining a Layered Model, supra note 2, at 15.
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particular, policymakers should endeavor to place the specific obligation at
the lower physical layers as part of overall network requirements, and
allow the market sufficient time to develop robust and efficient solutions.
Those solutions in turn potentially could dwarf the technically-limited
capabilities of current-day programs and services.
vi. Investment in New Networks
The FCC has taken the view-correctly or not-that one of the chief
goals of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to encourage facilities-
based competition generally, and the deployment of advanced service
facilities specifically." 4 In the UNE Triennial Review Order, for example,
the FCC read the Act's "impairment" standard as restricting BOC
unbundling obligations for fiber-fed local loops and packet-switching
capabilities, based on its stated concern that unbundling requirements
would stifle BOC and CLEC economic incentives to invest in facilities-
based deployment of advanced services.315 As discussed previously, the
FCC's view on BOC broadband deployment incentives also appeared to
play a major role in its recent proposal to eliminate ISPs' rights to access
BOC-provisioned DSL transmission services on a nondiscriminatory
basis.316
There are several fundamental flaws in the FCC's approach. First, the
claimed legal distinction between loops used for voice services and loops
used for broadband services, as well as copper-based loops versus fiber-
based loops, is not at all clear. It appears that the FCC essentially decided
to treat disparately the same last-mile BOC facilities, based solely on the
underlying technology (Physical Layer) or end-user service (Applications
Layer). A straightforward market power analysis would have been more
productive, logical, and legally sustainable than taking liberties with the
1996 Act's "impairment" standard.
Second, the FCC's views on broadband investment incentives led it to
remove carrier access rights entirely for certain network functionalities.
Again, to the extent the Commission has valid concerns about such
incentives, those concerns should be dealt with head-on through careful
consideration of various economic factors, rather than the unbundling
regime. Initially, as Willig and others point out, there is significant
314. See, e.g., UNE Triennial Review Order, supra note 240, paras. 3, 241-246
(encouraging investment in next-generation network architecture suitable for delivering
advanced telecommunications capability is a critical policy objective).
315. Id. paras 255-85, 288.
316. See Part III.B.2.b, supra; Broadband Framework NPRM, supra note 261, paras. 3-
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evidence that unbundling actually creates additional incentives for carriers
to invest in network facilities.317 In addition, to the extent BOC investment
concerns are guided by UNE pricing concerns, the Commission now is in
the process of considering various aspects of its TELRIC cost standard." 8
By using the appropriate financial tools, for example, any risk and options
considerations can be handled by selecting the correct rate of return. 19
More to the point, the fundamental layering principle remains: focus
on where the concern lies (investment in Physical Access Layer facilities),
and then determine how best to achieve the goal without disrupting other
layer-affecting objectives (such as facilitating competition between and
across the layers). Applying the horizontal layers framework in this case
could provide some unique incentives to achieve the FCC's stated
objective. In particular, one plausibly could argue that the deregulatory
nature of the framework itself would encourage companies to move
existing applications to an IP platform, with all the salient gains in network
externalities. Such incentives should lead to multiple providers constructing
advanced networks and logical platforms at an accelerated pace.
vii. Retail Rate Regulation
Finally, Nakahata weighs in on the question of whether to continue
regulating retail telecommunications rates at the state and federal level:
The only application that still has significant retail rate regulation is
voice telephony. It is not at all clear that there is a compelling reason to
continue retail rate regulation of voice telephony, provided that
unbundling and resale policies are designed correctly at lower levels of
the network and can actually be provisioned. Market pricing issues
should be addressed with unbundling and resale policies.... At the
very least, rate regulation... should be eliminated for application
providers that truly lack market power.320
317. Robert D. Willig et al, Stimulating Investment and the Telecommunications Act of
1996, at 2-3. (Oct. 11, 2002) (submitted as ex parte filing by AT&T in Review of the
Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket
Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147) (on file with the Author).
318. Review of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network
Elements, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 18945, paras. 1-3 (2003).
319. See Kenneth Baseman et al, Depreciation and Capital Recovery Issues: A Response
to Professor Hausman, submitted as ex parte filing by MCI in CC Docket No. 96-98, July
24, 1996 (on file with the Author).
320. Nakahata, supra note 3, at 137. Nakahata believes that retail rate deregulation
would greatly rationalize prices, and allow the market to innovate new ways of selling
competitive services. Id. at 137-38.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
Thus, a layers-based approach provides unique insights that, in this
particular case, can lead to the deregulation of retail services that otherwise
would be subject to regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
Layers analysis offers a fresh and compelling way to look at legacy
U.S. legal and regulatory policies. In the e-commerce world, where ISPs
face the prospects of legal liability for the actions of third parties using
their network, a horizontal layers framework exposes the very real dangers
of overzealous and ill-reasoned regulation at disparate layers. In the world
of telecommunications regulation, the framework provides a valuable new
mechanism for assessing harm from the exercise of undue market power,
and suggesting practical alternatives. In particular, a layers model can assist
policymakers in targeting regulation to foster needed competition at the
core (or lower layers) of the network, while preserving and enhancing
innovation at the edge (or upper layers). Well founded on fundamental
engineering principles, and buttressed by economic analysis, the layers
principle, as expressed in this Article's notion of a Network Layers Model,
should be adopted by policymakers as a necessary and productive public
policy tool.
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